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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
A ppellee /Petitioner, 
v. 
Supreme Court Case No. 20170304 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20140602-CA 
District Court Case No. 131902542 
COOPERJOHN ANTHONY VAN 
HUIZEN, 
Juvenile Court Case No. 1003447 
Appellant/Respondent. 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(i) and (5) provide the Court's jurisdiction 
over the juvenile court's rulings and the court of appeals' decision. 
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
1. Are Van Huizen's preservation and prejudice analyses correct? 
This Court reviews the court of appeals' legal analysis for correctness. E.g. 
D.J. Inv. Group, LLC v. DAE/Westbrook, LLC, 2006 UT 62, ~10, 147 P.3d 414. 
The court of appeals reached these issues that are thus preserved. See,~ 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ii 16, 61 P.3d 1062. 
2. Was counsel ineffective during the Serious Youth Offender prelirninary 
hearing? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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This Court addresses claims of ineffective assistance of counsel not ruled on 
by lower courts as matters of law. ~!> State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
3. Do the juvenile court's misintetpretations of the Serious Youth Offender 
statute constitute plain error and establish prejudice from the failure to self-recuse? 
The juvenile court's statuto1-y interpretations and applications of the Serious 
Youth Offender Act are legal conclusions entitled to no deference on appeal. E.g. In 
re F.L., 2015 UT App 224, iJ17, 359 P.3d 693. 
The plain error doctrine requires proof of an obvious and prejudicial error, 
and provides relief from less obvious but highly prejudicial errors. See,~ State v. 
Eldredg~, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
Issues 2 and 3 were raised in the adult district court after sentencing (R. 80-99, 
110-112, 219-235, 414-456, 472-92, 508-524). The district court refused to hold a 
hearing or reach the merits of the claims (R. 464-65, 586-98). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §78a-6-702 (2013), Utah Code Jud. Admin R. 1.2 and 2.11. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992), and State v. 
Van Huizen, 2017 UT App 30,392 P.3d 933, correctly hold it is the duty of our 
judges to protect the integrity of our judicial system by identifying the judges' 
relationships that might pose conflicts of interest and require their disqualification. 
2 
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Reichert. at 25 7 n. 7; Van H uizen, ii 17. 
Van Huizen correctly applied In re D.B., 2012 UT 65,, 34, 289 P.3d 459, a 
case decided under the exceptional circumstances doctrine, in ruling that because 
Cooper was not aware of the juvenile court judge's marriage to the C~ef Deputy of 
the Criminal Division of the prosecuting office in time to move for disqualification, 
Cooper would not be faulted for failing to preserve the disqualification issue. Van 
Huizen, ii 50 n.15. 
The court correctly applied Reichert, in granting relief absent a traditional 
showing of prejudice. The coU1i: recognized that the_ burden did not shift to Cooper 
to establish prejudice on appeal under State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 
1988), and State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998), because Cooper was 
unaware of and thus had no opportunity to raise the disqualification issue through the 
Rule 29 disqualification process, wherein a reviewing judge would have vetted the 
disqualification issue. Van Huizen at~~ 53-56. The court properly applied Reichert 
because the bindover decision was made solely by the judge and did not have a jury 
or intetvening decision maker to ameliorate the effects of any partiality of the judge. 
Van Huizen at~, 57-59, 63-64. 
Plain errors in the bindover order provide alternate bases for affirmance and 
establish prejudice from the court's failure to self-recuse. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel at the SYO preliminary hearing provides 
alternative bases for affirmance of the reversal of the bindover order. Trial counsel's 
performance was objectively deficient, as counsel failed to prepare and advocate 
3 
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properly in the SYO preliminaty hearing. Counsel failed to investigate the facts and 
the law, and did not inform the court that the SYO statute changed drastically in 
juveniles' favor over seven months prior to Cooper's SYO preliminary hearing. His 
omissions were not conceivably reasonably strategic. There is a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable result absent counsel's objectively deficient perfo1mance. 
Individually and cumulatively, 1 the foregoing errors justify affirmance. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. VAN HUIZEN IS CORRECTLY DECIDED. 
A. VAN HUIZEN SQUARES WITH THIS COURT'S 
PRECEDENTS ON PRESERVATION. 
1. Van Huizen Correctly Applies D.B. 
The preservation requirement ensures that trial courts have the opportunity to 
correct errors prior to appeal, and prevents parties from taking advantage on appeal 
of claims they opted not to raise in the u-ial courts. E.g. Scott v. Scott, 2017 UT 66, ,I 
15, _ P.3d _. Neither function would be served by applying the preservation 
mle to Cooper's failure to move to disqualify the judge, because Cooper was unaware 
of and the court did not disclose her marriage to the Chief Criminal Deputy of the 
prosecuting office in time for Cooper to move for the judge's disqualification (R. 428, 
657, 659-662). 
1 The cumulative error doctrine involves consideration of all identified and 
assumed errors., and requires reversal if the errors undermine the Court's confidence 
in the fairness of the proceedings. See,~ State v. Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ,r 13, 
275 P.3d 1050. 
4 
• 
• Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T'he State faults the court of appeals for not applying the preservation rule. 
State's brief at 17-32. It fails to acknowledge that Van I-Iuizen is applying In re D.B., 
2012 UT 65, if 34, 289 P.3d 459, in holding the general burden to preserve the 
disqualification claim is not fairly cast on Cooper, because he did not have notice of 
the disqualifying facts, and thus had no opportunity to raise the disqualification claim 
in juvenile court. Van Huizen, 2017 UT App 30, iJ16, 37, 50 and 56 and nn. 12, 15 
and 19. As this Court acknowledged in State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 70, D.B. is 
properly read as an example of the Court's utilizing the exceptional circumstances 
doctrine to avert manifest injustice to remedy an error that arose in the lower court's 
final judgment, a rare procedural anomaly wherein D.B. had no opportunity to object 
and preserve his claim in the lower court. Id. at if 34. D.B. and the cases cited 
therein hold that a party is not fairly expected to have objected to legal errors that 
arose when the party had no opportunity to object. See D.B., 2012 UT 65 at~ 17 
and n.2 (discussing exceptional circumstances doctrine) and at ~134-35 (holding 
juvenile was not required to preserve claim of error in court's imposition of 
accomplice liability because juvenile had no notice or opportunity to object to the 
error that arose for the first time in court's final order; citing similar cases). 
The rationale of D.B. applies here, as the court of appeals correctly found that 
Cooper was not aware of the judge's marriage to the Chief Criminal Deputy until 
after Cooper was bound over to district court (R. 428, 657, 659-662). Compare D.B. 
Guvenile was not aware of objectionable ruling until weeks after it issued). Cooper's 
learning of the issue when it was too late to object constitutes a rare procedural 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
anomaly that justifies relieving him of the preservation requirement, particularly given 
the manifest injustice that othenvise would result, and significant constitutional rights 
and liberty interest at stake.2 See Johnson,~ 37 (exceptional circumstances doctrine 
allows courts to relieve parties of preservation requirement to avert manifest injustice, 
protect constitutional rights and liberty interests, and se1-ve interests in judicial 
economy when rare procedural anomalies arise). 
2. The Record Shows the Juvenile Judge and Juvenile 
Defense Counsel Were Not Acquainted. 
In discussing the preservation issue, the State asserts its factually erroneous 
and oft-repeated claim that the juvenile court may have known that Cooper's juvenile 
court counsel knew of her marriage to the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division of 
the Weber County Attorney's Office, thus alleviating the duty to disclose. State's 
briefat2,12, 15,21,24,3~31,32,35,36. 
The judge had no reason to know that Cooper's juvenile court counsel was 
aware of her marriage, as the judge and Cooper's lawyer were not acquainted. 
Juvenile counsel Rex Bray entered his appearance in the Weber County Juvenile 
2A child's liberty interest is at stake in proceedings designed to move the child 
from the juvenile to the adult system. State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ~ 15, 245 P.3d 
7 45. Given that children prosecuted in adult court may be housed and endangered in 
adult facilities, life may also be at stake. See,~' Katz Levi, "State v. Mohl: State 
Sanctioned Abuse," 10 Journal of Law and Family Studies 173, 17 4-76 and 
accompanying notes (2007) (explaining how incarcerating children in adult jails 
endangers children, and increases the risk of suicide). 
The se1-vice of an impartial and competent judge is required by Due Process 
Clause of the federal constitution and Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
Caperton v. A.C. Massey, Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Arizona v. Fulrninante, 499 U.S. 
279, 309-310 (1991); Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). 
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Court in Ogden, listing his Sandy office address, on November 13, 2013. The first 
time he appeared before the juvenile court, when he told the judge his name, she 
responded, "I'm son-y?" and then he restated his name and spelled his last name for 
her and then she thanked him (T. 11/19/13: 2). When they were scheduling 
prelirri.inary hearing, Mr. Bray informed the court he was coming from Draper in Salt 
Lake County (f. 11/19/13: 8). When the court asked Mr. Bray his position on 
detention, she did not address him by name, but addressed him, "Sir- Counsel'' (f. 
11/19/13: 10). :rvlr. Bray did not attend the four detention hearings that followed the 
November 19 hearing before the preliminary hearing (T. 11/25/13; 12/2/13; 
12/9/13; 12/10/13). At preliminary hearing, the court accidentally addressed Mr. 
Bray as Mr. Van Huizen (PH 118). This record disposes of the State's repeated 
assertions that the judge may have had no duty to disclose her marriage as she had 
reason to lmow that Cooper's counsel was aware of the marriage. 
The State incorrectly asserts the court of appeals "surmised the juvenile court 
likely presumed that Defendant's counsel was aware of the relationship." State's brief 
at 10. Van Huizen indicates the juvenile court judge may have assumed counsel's 
awareness but could not legally have rested on this assumption, as it was Cooper's 
decision whether to assert the disqualification issue. Id. at il3 7 n.11. 
3. Cooper Is Not Bound by his Attorney's Unknowing 
Purported Waiver. 
The State incorrectly contends that Cooper should be bound on a theory of 
agency by his la,vyer's failure to raise the disqualification issue. State's brief at 21. 
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No agency theory would apply in this criminal case wherein it would have been 
ineffective assistance of counsel had counsel knowingly forfeited Cooper's right to 
move for disqualification. Cf.,~' Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,r 77, 150 P.3d 
480 (finding agency theoty does not apply when an attorney in a capital post-
conviction case commits ineffective assistance of counsel). A criminal defense 
attorney's forfeiture of a client's rights is not properly treated as a knowing and 
intelligent or constitutionally valid waiver of the rights by the client. See,~ State v. 
Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ,r 31, 137 P.3d 716. 
The State notes that Elizabeth Hunt did not raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance against Mr. Bray for not moving to disqualify the judge, State's brief at 18 
n.3. As Mr. Bray was not acquainted with the judge and the judge did not disclose 
her marriage(~ T. 11/19/13: 2, PH 118), there is no factual basis for such a claim. 
B. VAN HUIZEN SQUARES WITH THIS COURT'S 
PRECEDENTS ON PREJUDICE. 
1. The State's Factual Positions are Incorrect. 
The State's argument as to the ~applicability of Reichert hinges on its 
factually incorrect positions that the juvenile judge may have had reason to believe 
that Cooper's juvenile court counsel was aware of her marriage to the Chief Criminal 
Deputy, alleviating the need to disclose the disqualifying facts, and that the judge's 
husband was screened from participation in Cooper's case. State's brief at 35-37. The 
judge had no reason to think Cooper's lawyer knew of her marriage; the lawyer and 
judge were not acquainted (T. 11/19/13: 2-10). 
8 
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The record shows the Chief Criminal Deputy was acting as a lawyer on the 
case at least in the adult court proceedings (R. 635, docket entries on 5/21/14, R.. 
523). The Chief Criminal Deputy contacted Elizabeth Hunt to address Cooper's case 
on Weber County Attorney Dee Smith's behalf on May 19> 2014> after Hunt began 
contacting Mr. Smith and the juvenile court prosecutor Brody Flint in efforts to settle 
the case and obtain discovery (R. 523). 
Page 8 of the district court docket also shows on May 21, 2015, the Chief 
Deputy ordered recordings of the hearings on March 19, 2014 and May 7, 2014 (R. 
635, docket entries on 5/21/14).3 The State argues incorrectly that the Chief Deputy 
requested the copies of the proceedings only in response to Hunt's document 
requests, State's brief at 13, 24, and 26. Hunt had the hearings transcribed by May 18, 
2014, three days before the Chief Deputy ordered the recordings on May 21, 2014, 
and cited the transcripts in her memoranda filed on May 19, 2014. See R. 627 
(reporter's certificate for two transcripts); R. 82-92, 102-112 (memoranda citing 
transcripts). Contra1-y to page 26 of the State's brief> when Hunt asserted in the 
opening brief in the court of appeals that the judge's husband ordered portions of the 
3 The court of appeals erroneously indicated it was the same day the juvenile 
judge signed the bindover order that the Chief Deputy ordered digital copies of 
proceedings. Van Huizen, ,I 3 7. The record shows the judge signed the bindover 
order roughly four months before the Chief Deputy ordered recordings (R. 28-31, R. 
635, docket entries on 5/21/14). The State emphasizes this error, State's brief at 14, 
26, but does establish its materiality. Regardless of when the Chief Deputy ordered 
the records, and particularly because he was the attorney who first contacted Hunt on 
behalf of the Weber County Attorney (R. 523), his involvement confirms he was an 
attorney working on and in the chain of command in Cooper's case, who was not 
screened from his wife's cases. Van Huizen, if 40. 
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record after Hunt began challenging Cooper's convictions, Hunt described the order 
of events and did not concede that the judge's husband ordered the records in 
response to her request. 
'I'he assertion in the record that the Chief Deputy had no supervisory role or 
involvement in the juvenile court portion of the case, State's brief at 8-9, 11, 16, 24-
25, 29, is not "evidence" as the State claims on page 25 of its brief. It appears in an 
unsworn argument of the juvenile court prosecutor (R. 505) that was unsupported by 
a declaration, even after the absence of supporting evidence was raised (R. 515). 
The record disproves the State's assorted positions that the record shows that 
the Chief Deputy was mostly likely screened from this case, most likely would not 
have been involved in this case, was not involved in the case, and had nothing to do 
with this case, State's brief at 2, 11, 12-13, 22, 24, 27, 29, 30, and 36. 
2. Van Huizen Properly Applies Reichert, which Should Not Be 
Overruled. 
The State contends that under Van Huizen and Reichert, litigants will be 
encow:aged to take unfair advantage on appeal by sitting silent when their cases are 
presided over by unqualified judges. State's brief at 15-17, 33, 38-40. Reichert 
remains controlling, as the State does not ask the Court to overrule it, cf. ~ 11AA 
Prospector v. Fahner, 2017 UT 68, ,I~ 18-19, _ P.3d _ (declining to revisit 
precedent left unaddressed by party who did not ask for overruling), or carry the 
heavy burden to justify overruling this precedent,~ State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
10 
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398 (Utah 1994) (under stare decfris, this Court has authority to overrule its precedents 
if the Court is clearly convinced the precedent was erroneous when decided). 
The State's concern is inapposite to both cases, as Cooper and Mr. Reichert 
were not aware of the disqualifying facts in time to move for disqualification or make 
a reek.less and expensive tactical decision to proceed with an ostensibly partial judge 
to plant error for appeal. No party can take unfair advantage of an error they do not 
know about, particularly if judges do their duties to disclose disqualifying facts and/ or 
recuse themselves. Reichert and Van Huizen correctly apply well-established Utah 
law requiring our judges, rather than unknowing litigants or their counsel, to 
scrupulously protect the appearance of our justice system by passing on the cases 
wherein their impartiality is reasonably subject to question. E.g .. State v. Neeley, 748 
P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988)("a judge should recuse himself when his "impartiality" 
might reasonably be questioned .... the integrity of the judicial system should be 
protected against any taint of suspicion.))), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1220 (1988). 
The State seeks to distinguish Reichert, because it only remanded for re-
argument before a different panel of the court of appeals, whereas Van Huizen 
purportedly undoes an entire criminal prosecution. State's brief at 37. Van Huizen 
ordered a new SYO preliminary hearing. If Cooper does not prevail, his pleas, 
convictions and sentence in adult court stand. Van Huizen at 1 65. Regardless of 
whether he prevails, he has served his entire prison sentence. Id. at ii 9. 
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The State observes that a court's violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct 
does not justify reversal of a criminal conviction, particularly when the record shows 
the defendant was not prejudiced. State's brief at 40-41. 
Van Huizen recognizes that a judge's violation of disqualification law does not 
necessarily justify a new trial. Id. at 1151. As the court first reasoned, the line of 
disqualification cases requiring proof of prejudice are appeals imposing this burden 
after Utah R. Crim. P. 29 procedures in the trial courts, wherein known causes for 
disqualification are presumably adjudicated properly by original judges and then 
further vetted by neutral reviewing district judges before appeal. See id. at ,r~ 51-56, 
discussing Neeley; Alonzo; and State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989). The 
court of appeals' reasoning is entirely consistent with Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 979, and 
Neeley, 948 P.2d at 1094-95, wherein this CoU11 held that once rule 29 procedures 
have occurred, the burden shifts to the def end ant to prove prejudice. 
The Van Huizen court contrasted the Rule 29 cases with Reichert, wherein 
this Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals without a showing of 
prejudice, as a result of an undisclosed and disqualifying relationship between a court 
of appeals judge and two attomeys not involved in the appeal, who were working for 
the firm involved in the appeal and related to the judge by marriage. The Van Huizen 
court reasoned that in Reichert and Van Huizen, it was proper to abstain from 
requiring proof of prejudice, because the disqualifying facts came to light after rule 29 
disqualification procedures were available, and thus, there was no layered district 
court consideration of the need for disqualification by the original and reviewing 
12 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
judges prior to appeal, as is normally provided in Rule 29 proceedings. Van Huizen 
at ,1,r 52-56, 58-59. The State does not address or dispute this reasoning. 
The Van Huizen court next correctly reasoned that prejudice must be shown 
for failure to disqualify in cases such as Alonzo, Neeley and Gardner, wherein the 
rule 29 procedures occurred and the ultimate decision was made by jurors, who 
insulated the ultimate result from the apparent bias of the judges. See, id. at ~1 57-
58. In cases such as Reichert and Van Huizen, there was no independent decision-
maker to insulate the ultimate result from the courts' apparent bias. Id. at ~157-59. 
Similar to the judge in Reichert who participated in the ultimate decision of the court 
of appeals, Cooper's juvenile court judge made an independent factual and legal 
inquity that resulted in the dispositive order sending Cooper from the protections of 
the juvenile court and into the adult system. Van Huizen at 158. As there was only 
one decision maker, and her husband was not screened from but was involved in this 
case at least following the bindover, the 11.sk of effect from the disqualifying facts was 
greater than in Reichert, where only one judge on a thtee judge panel was related by 
marriage to attorneys who were not involved in the appeal but were part of a firm 
involved in the appeal. 
The State contends incorrectly that Van H uizen reversed the bindover order 
despite finding the failure to recuse harmless, State's brief at 16. Van Huizen 
distinquished the cases such as Gardner finding judicial disqualification errors 
harmless. Van Huizen, i[sl. Van Huizen abstained from conducting a harmless 
error analysis, because there was no Rule 29 vetting process, given the highly 
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discretionary and fact intensive nature of the bindover decision made solely by the 
juvenile court judge, and in light of the absence of a jury to insulate the case from the 
effects of the apparent bias of the decision-maker. See id. ,r,r 52-62. 
Because Van Huizen squares with this Court's precedents on judicial 
disqualification and prejudice, the Court should aff11m it. 
C. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS, OR SHOULD 
REJECT THE STATE'S CHALLENGES TO THE 
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE OF THE NEED FOR THE JUDGE 
TO DISCLOSE THE MARRIAGE OR RECUSE HERSELF. 
1. The State's Arguments Exceed the Grant of Certiorari 
and Misstate the Court of Appeals' Decision. 
In addressing the preservation issue, the State argues as if Van Huizen 
justified its preservation analysis with its substantive ruling that Rule 2.11 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Conduct required the judge to disclose her marriage or recuse 
herself, given her husband's involvement in the case. The State then argues that the 
judge was not plainly required ·to disclose the marriage or recuse, as the record does 
not t.1.1..ily show that the judge's husband was involved in Cooper's case. State's brief 
at 20, 22-30 citing,I,I 37, 48, 50 and n.15 of Van Huizen. 
T'he Van Huizen court's preservation analysis appears in one footnote and 
does not encompass the substantive issue of whether the judge had a duty to recuse 
or disclose her marriage under Rule 2.11. Van H uizen, ,I 50 n.15. 
This Court's order granting certiorari does not allow for this issue to be raised 
by tl~e State. See Court's Order granting certiorari dated 7 /5/17, in the addendum. 
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This Court should protect its authority to select issues for certiorari review and 
disallow efforts to usurp it in violation of the rules of appellate procedure requiring 
parties to petition for permission to raise issues on certiorari,~, Utah R. App. P. 
45-49. See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995)(rejecting petitioner's 
claim outside grant of certiorari). 
While he maintains the Court should not address the State's unpe1mitted 
arguments, out of an abundance of caution, Cooper responds. 
2. The State's Arguments Ar.e Factually and Legally 
Incorrect. 
The State repeatedly argues that the court of appeals acted contrarily to the 
record and on the unfounded the assumption that the juvenile judge's husband was 
involved in and in the chain of command in this case. State's brief at 2, 11, 12-13, 22, 
24, 27, 29, 30, 36. The court actually recognized that the Chief Deputy gaye at least 
some assistance to the juvenile court prosecutor. Id.- at ,r,r 9, 37, 40. As detailed 
above, the judge's husband did participate in Cooper's case at least in adult court (R. 
523, R. 635, docket entries on 5/21/14). 
The State argues that the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division of the Weber 
County Attorney's Office was not "an officer, director, general partner, managing 
member, or trustee of a party" because he has no financial interest in the success of 
the Weber County Attorney's Office. State's brief at 27. Assuming the relevance of 
his financial interests, the Chief Deputy's position and employment were ostensibly 
contingent on the effectiveness of his work as the Chief Deputy. 
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Of greater importance, the focus of Rule 2.11 is not on the interests of the 
people to whom the judge is tied, it is on the appearance of our judicial system. The 
judge's husband, as the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division, ostensibly to the 
public was an officer, manager or director in a powerful position over any criminal 
case prosecuted by the Weber County Attorney's Office, and the public court record 
shows his involvement in the case (R. 635, docket entries on 5/21/14). The judge 
presiding over a juvenile case wherein the Weber County Attorney's Office's goal was 
to move the juvenile to the adult system for adult prosecution and incarceration, who 
was married to the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division, who was not screened 
from her cases, should have passed the case to another judge, to protect public 
confidence in the fairness of these important procee~gs. See Rule 2.11 and 
commentaiJ. The Chief Deputy's titled position falls within the plain language of 
(A)(2)(a).4 The judge's husband's position as the Chief Deputy of the Criminal 
Division is at least sufficiently analogous to the listed examples to require recusal 
under the non-exclusive language of 2.11, as the judge's impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned by virtue of her marriage to the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division. 
Contrary to page 29 of the State's brief, the record shows that the judge's 
4 The Van Huizen com-t correctly noted that the term officer applies to 
government employees, but was uncertain as to its application because of uncertainty 
of whether the Chief Deputy was elected or appointed. Id. at iJ 25-26. The code 
indicates that deputy attorneys are employed or deputized by county attorneys, Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-18a-602, and makes no mention of electing deputies. As the rule 
does not distinguish between elected and appointed officers, and the goal is to 
protect the appearance of our justice system, judges are properly encouraged to 
recuse if they have qualifying relationships to people in specified or similar positions. 
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husband had more than a de miminis interest in the case.5 He \Vas one of the 
prosecuting party's lawyers and acting as a lawyer in this case at least after his wife 
issued the bindover order and after Cooper began challenging his convictions and 
sentences (R.. 635, docket entries on 5/21/14, R. 523). This required recusal or 
disclosure under 2.11(A), (A)(1), (A)(2)(b) and (A)(2)(c). See Van Huizen at ii 27 
(recognizing rule 2.11(A)(2)(b) and (c) seem applicable). 
The State's argument that the judge's husband was not a party to the proceeding 
under (A)(2)(a) of Rule 2.11, State's brief at 27, is not explained. This Court should 
not address it. State v. Nelson, 355 P.3d 1031, i[40, 2015 UT 62 (declining to address 
inadequately briefed issue). 
This Court should leave undisturbed Van Huizen's holdings that reversal of 
the bindover order is required under Rules 1.2 and 2.11 as a result of the judge's 
man-iage to the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division, which gave rise to a 
reasonable question of partiality, and the court's unfulfilled duty to disclose the facts 
or self-recuse. 
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE SERIOUS 
YOUTH OFFENDER PRELIMINARY HEARING 
5 The terminology definition in the Code of Judicial Conduct reflects: 
"De minimis," in the context of interests pertaining to disqualification of a 
judge, means an insignificant interest that could not raise a reasonable 
question regarding the judge's impartiality. See Rule 2.11. 
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The right to effective assistance of counsel applies when children are being 
prosecuted in SYO preliminary bearings, wherein they arc at risk of being transferred 
to the adult system. ~, Houskeeper v. State, 2008 UT 78, il~ 38-40, 197 P.3d 636. 
To establish ineffective assistance, Cooper must specify acts or omissions that were 
objectively unreasonable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 (1984). 
He must overcome the presumption that counsel's strategies were "within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance.n Stricldand, 466 U.S. at 689. Thorough 
investigation of the facts and law are prerequisite to fo1mulatio11 of sound strategy, 
and essential to a constitutionally adequate defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; State 
v. J .A.L., 2011 UT 27, il 27, 262 P .3d 1. Trial lawyers must properly presetve all 
issues. See,~ State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at iJ 10, 67 P.3d 1005. When 
counsel fail to assert beneficial, current law, this objectively deficient performance 
will not be excused with hypothetical tactical reasons. See, State v. Moritzsky. 771 
P.2d 688,692 (Utah App. 1989). To show prejudice, Cooper must show with less 
than a preponderance of the evidence a reasonable probability of a more favorable 
result absent the objectively deficient performance. Strickland at 694. 
A. COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO 
INFORM THE COURT ABOUT THE 2013 
AMENDMENTS TO THE SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER 
STATUTE. 
Stricldand puts the burden squarely on the shoulders of defense counsel to 
fully investigate and assert the law governing at the time of Cooper's SYO 
preliminaty hearing. Id. at 690. During Cooper's SYO preliminary hearing on 
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December 20, 2013, no one mentioned the amendments to the Serious Youth 
Offender Act that went into effect on May 14, 2013. Prior to the amendments in 
May of 2013, our juvenile courts had very little discretion to retain minors under the 
SYO statute. Juveniles bore a "heavy burden" to overcome the presumption that 
they would transfer to the adult court, and had to show by clear and convincing 
evidence all of the retention factors: that they were less culpable than co-perpetrators, 
that their role in the offense was not violent, aggressive or premeditated, and that 
they had no prior delinquency involving a weapon that would have been a felony 
offense if an adult had committed it. E.g., Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-702(3)(b) and (c) 
(2012); State v. F.L.R., 2006 UT App 294, ifiJ3 and 4, 141 P.3d 601. The rationale 
behind the pre-2013 version of the SYO statute was that public safety was served by 
sending young offenders into the adult system, despite the fact that juveniles might 
benefit from the rehabilitative services of the juvenile court. M.E.P. v. State, 2005 
UT App 227, if 14 n. 4, 114 P.3d 596; State ex rel. A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1098-99 
(Utah App. 1997). Under the pre-2013 version of the SYO statute, courts were not 
to consider whether juveniles were amenable to rehabilitation. See A.B., supra, at 
1098. 
Under the 2013 amended statute, juvenile courts obtained discretion to retain 
juveniles based on an ultimate assessment of the juveniles' and the public's interest in 
the juveniles' remaining in juvenile court. Under the 2013 statute, juveniles no longer 
bear the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence all of the subsidiary 
considerations -- that they had no prior weapons-related adjudications, that their 
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relative culpability was lower than their co-perpetrators, and that their roles in the 
offenses were not violent, premeditated and aggressive. Rather, these factors are 
considered to the degree they may be present, along with the juveniles' prior history 
or lack thereof in the juvenile courts, and whether retaining them in juvenile court 
better serves the public safety interest than sending them into the adult system. See 
78A-6-702(3) (2013). Considerations such as the juveniles' amenability to treatment, 
risk of re-offense, and availability of developmentally appropriate treatment in the 
juvenile system are now subject to consideration under the 2013 amended statute, 
which factors in whether the public's interest in safety and general interests and the 
minor's interests are best set-ved by retaining the minors in juvenile court. See Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78A-6-702(3)(b) and (c)(v) (2013). 
The 2013 SYO statute added the requirement of ultimate weighing of whether 
sending the juvenile into the adult system would be contrary to the public interest in 
general the juvenile's interest in general, Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-702(3)(b), and 
added in the list of subsidiary considerations the question of whether the public 
safety interest is better served by keeping juveniles in juvenile court or sending 
juveniles into the adult system, and the nature and number of the defendant's prior 
juvenile court adjudications. § 78A-6-702(3)(c)Qv) and (v). 
Under standard rules of statutory construction, statutory amendments are 
presumed to alter existing legal rights or to clarify previous legislative intentions. 
E.g., Hercules Inc. v. State Tax Cornm'n., 2000 UT App 372, if 13, 21 P.3d 231. The 
2013 statutoty amendments, requiring retention analysis to weigh the public interest 
20 
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and the juvenile's .interest in retention and to consider the public safety interest, 
require a full inquiry into the juveniles' risk of re-offense and amenability to 
rehabilitation in the juvenile system. This is consistent with our constitutional law 
requiring the important decision of transferring a juvenile to the adult system to be 
premised on a thorough investigation, made in compliance with statutory directives, 
and sufficiently detailed to ensure thorough appellate review. E.g., State in re 
Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1985); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 
553 (1966). 
Assuming the statutory amendments were less than clear, our law recognizes 
when the plain language of statutes does not clearly reflect what the legislature 
intended, it is appropriate explore legislative history to clarify legislative intent. See, 
~ Sullivan v. Scouler Grain Company of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993), 
superseded by statute on other ~ounds, Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, ~ 12, 
48 P.3d 218. The legislative history behind the 2013 amendments to the SYO Act 
confirms the amendments were designed to serve the interests of the public and 
juveniles in reducing recidivism by having juveniles who are amenable to reform, 
particularly first time offenders such as Cooper, utilize the resources in the juvenile 
system, rather than enter tl1e adult system. Given tl1e language of the statuto1-y 
amendments and essential legislative history,~ Sullivan, full inquiry into Cooper's 
amenability to treatment and low risk of re-offense was essential under the 2013 
amendments. 
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The rationale for the amendments is found in the legislative history for House 
Bill 105 from the 2013 general session that reflects the SYO statute was amended to 
increase the discretion of juvenile court judges to retain juveniles, and to decrease the 
burden of proof on juveniles in the retention phase of SYO prelimina1-y hearings, and 
thereby reduce the number of juveniles who were being transferred into the adult 
system without first exhausting the resources of the juvenile system, in order to serve 
the best interests of both juveniles and the public. See 
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip id=2796&meta id=76536 
, (testimony of J acey Skinner, Director of the Utah Sentencing Commission, before 
the House Standing Judiciary on February 22, 2013; 
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?dip id=2864&meta id=78203 
(floor debate commentai-y by bill sponsor, Representative Low1-y Snow); and 
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip id=3146&meta id=85441 
(floor debate commentary by Senator Lyle Hillyard), transcribed in the addendum. 
The amendments were made to account for the fact that juveniles who are sent into 
the adult system are frequently released from adult confinement relatively quickly 
without rehabilitative inte1-vention and resources, and tend to recidivate more 
frequently and more violently tl1an those retained in the juvenile system. Thus, 
contrary to prior thought, public safety interests coincide with the juveniles' interests 
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in juveniles staying in juvenile courts, where they have the benefits of rehabilitative 
services. See id. 6 
As is detailed herein, counsel's failure to inform the court of the amended law 
was prejudicial for under the 2013 amendments, Cooper should have remained in 
juvenile court. 
B. COUNSEL VJ/AS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO 
PREPARE AND PRESENT THE RETENTION CASE. 
In Houskeeper, supra, the Court held that counsel was objectively deficient in 
failing to investigate and present expert testimony to the effect that the aggravated 
sexual assault bound over from the preliminaty hearing was not violent or aggressive, 
id, and that Houskeeper was prejudiced by this, given that the jll11 who heard the 
appropriate expert testimony at ttial convicted him only of attempted rape. Id. at ,i,r 
6 Multiple studies document that transferring juveniles into the adult system 
disserves the interests of the public in safety and the interests of the minors, for in 
the adult system, minors do not receive the benefits of the age-appropriate 
rehabilitative set-vices available in juvenile court, and are often released early without 
effective intei-vention. This phenomenon, coupled with the housing of 
impressionable and developing minors with adult offenders, and the stigmatizing 
effect of adult prosecution, results in increased recidivism, particularly violent 
recidivism, among juvenile offenders in the adult system, as compared to those who 
remain in the juvenile system. See, ~ 11] uvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective 
Deterrent to Delinquency" by Richard Redding in the OJJDP bulletin (2008) 
(bttps://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1 /ojjdp/220595.pdf); "Different from Adults: An 
Updated Analysis of Juvenile Transfer and Blended Sentencing Law, With 
Recommendations for Reform11 by the National Center for Juvenile Justice (Nov 
2008) (http://www.ncjj.org/PDF /MFC/MFC Transfer 2008.pdf); "Transfer of 
Juveniles to Adult Court: Effects of a Broad Policy in One Court11 by Edward Mulvey 
and Carol Schubert, OJJDP Juvenile Justice Bulletin December 2012 
(httJ_J://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/232932.pdf); and "The Effectiveness of Declining 
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction,>' Washington State Institute for Public Policy, December 
2013. 
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41-51. The Court found prejudice even though Houskeeper did not challenge the 
fairness of the trial he had in adult court, wherein he was convicted of a lesser offense 
for which he may have been found delinquent in juvenile court. In finding prejudice, 
the Court recognized that the juvenile-court adjudications would have been subject to 
expungement, whereas the adult conviction was not, and that in the juvenile system, 
Houskeeper's best interests would have been the focus of the proceedings, and he 
would have been eligible for the rehabilitative services. Id. 
Cooper's counsel similarly failed to prepare his retention case in the SYO 
proceedings, and prejudiced Cooper in the same manner with this objectively 
deficient performance. Under the 2013 amended statute, the retention inquiry was 
defined by § 78A-6-702(3)(b) and (c). The overarching considerations of the interest 
of the minor and the public were informed by consideration of 
Id. 
(i) whether the minor has been previously adjudicated delinquent for an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if 
committed by an adult; 
(ii) if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, 
whether the minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of culpability 
than the codefendants; 
(iii) the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was committed 
in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner; 
(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the 
juvenile court; and 
(v) whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in 
the juvenile court or in the district court. 
1. Absence Of Qualifying Weapons Related History And 
Complete Absence of Prior History 
Cooper had no prior weapons-related offenses. He no prior adjudications in 
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the juvenile court. Counsel failed to argue that these separate statutory factors 
weighed separately and heavily in favor of retention (PH 119). 
2. Relative Culpability 
Counsel did not assert the law in effect at the time recognizing that the court 
should compare the behavior of the crime participants, and should not attribute the 
misconduct of others to Cooper in the relative culpability analysis (PH 119-120). 
Compare State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, ,I 28, 79 P.3d 951;7 with M.E.P. v. State, 
7 In Lara, the court reversed the juvenile court's application of the statute in 
finding that Lara had acted in a violent and aggressive way, because instead of 
focusing on Lara's actual individual role, the court "focused on the actions of the 
other participants." ,128. The court recognized that all offenses eligible for 
prosecution under the SYO statute are by nature violent, and that if a transfer order 
could be premised on the violent nature of the offenses charged, rather than on the 
basis of a comparison of the juvenile's behavior vis-a-vis his co-perpetrators, all SYO 
defendants would be transferred to the adult court. Id. at~ 29. The court also 
reversed the juvenile court's reasoning that Lara was equally culpable with his co-
perpetrators unless he could show no involvement in the crime. Id. at ,I 29. The 
court explained that if the juvenile were not involved in the crime, he would not have 
been charged, and that "the relevant inquiry is whether the juvenile is less 
blameworthy than the codefendants because he was not the initiator or driving force 
behind the crime, did not use a weapon or threaten the victim, or otherwise played a 
less active role in the crime." Id. Because Lara had stayed in the back seat of the car 
while his co-perpetrators perpetrated the robbe1y and assault, and only drove the 
victim's car away, the court found that he had carried his burden to show that his role 
in the offense involved less culpability than that of ~s co-perpetrators. Id. The court 
noted that the State had presented no form of conspiracy or aiding such as 
encouragement. Id. at ,130. 
As to premeditation, the court found that Lara's participation was incidental, 
not premeditated, because the co-perpetrators approached the victim, robbed her of 
her keys at gunpoint, had her kneel outside her car, looked in the car and then went 
and talked to Lara and gave him gave the keys, before Lara walked from the car he 
was in and got in the victim's truck and drove away, stopping to pick up a co-
perpetrator. Id. at ,ii 32-33. The court ruled that the facts showed that the other 
robbers decided that Lara would drive the stolen truck when they realized it had a 
standard transmission they could not drive, and that his role in the aggravated 
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2005 UT App 227, 114 P.3d 596;8 and State v. F.L.R., 2006 UT App 294, 141 P.3d 
601.9 This was hugely prejudicial because Cooper's relative culpability was by far the 
least of the participants', and the court attributed their misconduct to Cooper. See 
Point III, i1!fra. 
Cooper was the youngest and second smallest of the defendants,10 the oldest 
robbery was spontaneous, not premeditated. Id. The State petitioned for review of 
the reinstatement of the appeal on certiorari, and this Court affumed the court of 
appeals' opinion. State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, 124 P .3d 243. 
8 M.E.P. affirmed the juvenile court's finding that regardless of the fact that 
the defendant's conduct occurred during horseplay, it was nonetheless violent or 
aggressive. The defendant was playing with friends who were hitting one another 
with a computer pad. He grabbed a gun, checked to see that it was not loaded, and 
then pointed it at and shot his friend, causing serious bodily injury. The Court found 
M.E.P.'s conduct more akin to that in State ex rel Z.R.S., 951 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 
1998), wherein a juvenile's bindover order was affirmed because the defendant forced 
his way into a home with a large knife in his possession, and put his hand on the 
thigh of the eleven year old girl who was home and who felt threatened by this. The 
court found that M.E.P.'s conduct less like that in State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, 79 
P.3d 951, wherein the defendant's liability for an aggravated robbery arose when he 
drove a stolen car away from the victim after his two friends had removed the victim 
from the car at gunpoint, explaining, he "did not wi~ld a gun or approach the victim." 
"His liability for the crime was purely as an accomplice. See id. Therefore, we 
determined that his role in the offense 'was neither violent nor aggressive."' M.E.P. 
at, 17. "In Lara, the juvenile was quite removed from the violence and aggression of 
the underlying offense to which he was an accomplice, and thus his role was not 
violent or aggressive." M.E.P. at, 19. 
9 F.L.R.. affirmed juvenile court findings that the juvenile failed to show the 
requisite lack of violence and aggression, because the juvenile had a gun in his pocket 
and conducted a robbery by telling the victim he was armed, being in close proximity 
to her, blocking her from getting in her car, and taking her property. The court 
compared the facts of F.L.R. to those in Lara, wherein Lara sat in the car while his 
co-perpetrators committed the armed robbe1-y, and only drove the stolen car away. 
F.L.R., ~7. 
10 Cooper was 16 years 4 months old, 5'11" tall and weighed 150 pounds (R. 160). 
Wesley Brown was 18 years 10 months old, 6'2" tall, and weighed 217 pounds (R. 
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of whom, Wesley Brown and Dexter Skinner, had multiple felony cases pending (~ 
R. 167-69; R. 170-72). Skinner had schemed by text messages with Joshua Dutson 
the day before the robbery to "grab them straps" (Cooper's father's guns) and rob 
some people, while, in a separate text message conversation wherein Joshua claimed 
to be "high" and appeared to be joking, Joshua invited Cooper to rob some people 
(R. 295-96, 450). The next day, after Cooper was driven to Skinner by Tomek 
Perkins and did not bring the guns, Skinner and the others took Cooper back to his 
father's house to retrieve the guns and commit the robbery that Wesley had planned 
(R. 295-96, 450). Christian Davidson identified Skinner as the person who had his 
gun out by his side when the robbers forced their way into the home, and who 
threatened to pop a cap (shoot him) if Christian did not let them in (R. 247-49, 251 
253, 260, 261). During the robbery that followed the amicable conversation in the 
basement about Dexter's or Wesley's gun supposedly having bodies on it (people 
who had been killed buy it), Christian said that Dexter was the first one to point his 
gun at Christian and demand his property, and also demanded the other bag of 
marijuana Skinner had seen Christian put in his pocket before the robbery began (R. 
248, 251-52). Skinner demanded Christian's money and directed one of his cohorts 
to take Davidson's wallet and phone (K 254). Inasmuch as Christian originally 
indicated during the photo array that it was the third gunman who took his wallet and 
phone (R. 310), and then was unsure that Cooper was this person (R. 257), it appears 
165-66). Dexter Skinner was 18 years 4 months old, 6' tall, and weighed 185 pounds 
(R. 163-64). Tomek Perkins was 18 years 9 months eighteen years old, 5'6" tall, and 
weighed 120 pounds R. 162). Joshua Dutson was 17 years 2 months old, 6' tall, and 
weighed 160 pounds (R. 161). 
27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that Joshua Dutson, who admitted to being the third gunman (R.. 284, 289), was the 
person who took Christian's wallet and phone. 
Wesley Brown had previously lived in the· home where the robbety occurred, 
knew there would be drugs there, and planned the robbery (R. 248-49). He pulled a 
gun during the robbe11' and pointed it at Christian Davidson while discussing 
Brown's displeasure at Davidson's having awakened him with a pipe in a past 
incident (R. 255). Wesley went upstairs to pay an anned visit to Davidson's mother, 
who had previously taken Wesley in until he bragged of killing a man in Louisiana 
and she asked him to leave (R. 17 4, 282-83, 294). 
Tomek Perkins provided the real-looking airsoft gun used by Joshua during 
the robbery (R. 301-02). He brought Cooper to Skinner's house the morning of the 
robbery, drove everyone to Cooper's to retrieve his father's guns, and was the 
getaway driver for the robbery (R. 283, 288). 
Joshua Dutson was a juvenile whose phone records documented his dealing 
and using illegal drugs with multiple people (R. 267, 329-337). The day before the 
robbery, when Cooper texted him and asked him to "chill," Joshua suggested they go 
to Dexter's and smoke marijuana (R. 445-47). While claiming to be high,Joshua 
invited Cooper to participate in robbing people as if it were a joke, while 
simultaneously scheming with Dexter Skinner in a separate text message conversation 
about inviting Cooper to participate in robbing people, grabbing «them straps" 
(Cooper's father's guns), and robbing people the next day (R.. 295-96, 450). Joshua 
pulled and held the real-looking airsoft gun pointed at the ground during the robbei-y 
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(R. 247). 
Cooper was present and passive during the robbery; two of the three guns 
were retrieved from Cooper's father's house; none of the guns was loaded and one 
was broken (R.. 284, 296). Cooper initially agreed to participate in robbing 
unspecified people during the text conversation the day before (R. 447-449), but the 
actual robbery was planned the next day by Wesley Brown, who knew Davidson 
would have drugs (R. 282-83, 306). Cooper did not know Wesley or Tomek or 
Davidson before the day of the robbery (R. 293). As is detailed herein, the juvenile 
court held Cooper accountable for the other participants' criminal conduct in what 
should have been the relative culpability analysis. 
In closing argument, the prosecutor stated the ages of the codefendants and 
argued that they were all of similar age and experience, and were operating as a peer 
group, rather than as adults influencing the younger codefendants (R. 363). Counsel 
for Cooper presented no evidence and little argument that Cooper was the youngest 
defendant, smaller than all but one other defendant, and had no criminal history, in 
contrast to his codefendants, who were all older, all but one of whom were larger (R.. 
160-66), and the oldest two of whom, Wesley Brown and Dexter Skinner, had 
multiple felony cases pending (R. 161-73) (PH 120). When the detective testified 
about Cooper's interrogation and told the judge that Cooper initially omitted Wesley 
Brown from his description of the robbery but later agreed to tell the truth (R. 292-
93), counsel failed to cross-examine the officer about the key missing fact: Cooper 
wanted police protection before he was willing to acknowledge Wesley Brown's 
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participation (R. 427). The uni:efuted misimpressions left by the prosecutor's 
argument and evidence were that Cooper was operating with co-equal peers and was 
not influenced by anyone as they were all the same age (R. 363), and that Cooper was 
protecting Wesley Brown (R. 292-93). 
Trial counsel performed objectively deficiently in failing to show that Cooper 
was relatively less culpable and susceptible to the older, larger and more sophisticated 
defendants, who were not present for the juvenile court to see. The evidence was 
important to show that Cooper qualified for retention in the juvenile court under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-702(3)(ii). The evidence also aids in understanding 
Cooper's role in the offense as a manipulated pawn of the older, larger, more 
sophisticated, codefendants, and that Cooper thus qualified for retention in the 
juvenile court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-702(3)(iii). Cooper's relative 
vulnerability and lack of sophistication and criminality vis-a-vis his codefendants also 
infonns the relatively lesser public safety risks Cooper poses, and his and the public's 
general interest in his remaining in juvenile court, see U tab Code Ann. § 78A-6-
702(3)(b) and (c)(v). 
Counsel presented no law or evidence that children are less culpable and 
deserve greater leniency, because their brains are biologically underdeveloped and do 
not function well when it comes to making decisions and gauging the impact of their 
actions. 11 Nor did counsel inform the court through expert testimony or other means 
11 Scientific and sociological studies demonstrate that the brains of adolescent 
children are not yet fully developed, particularly in the frontal lobes, which control 
decision-making. E.g. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Children have an 
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as to the deleterious effects of marijuana on adolescent brains, 12 and as to how use of 
marijuana harms the portions of the brain are essential to decision-making.13 
3. Violent, Aggressive or Premeditated Role 
Counsel was ineffective in failing to inform the court that Cooper's role in the 
offense should focus on his behavior. See Lara, supra (requiring courts to distinguish 
and focus on role of the individual juvenile in assessing retention factors). As 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility and lack maturity, and thus often take 
impetuous and reckless actions and make decisions without thorough consideration. 
Roper at 569. Adolescents are less likely to restrain their impulses, understand the 
perspectives of others, and consider alternative actions. Id. Children's poor choices 
and actions are influenced by their impressionable nature and their vulnerability to 
peer pressure and other negative influences. Id. They have less control over their 
environments, or less experience controlling their environments, than adults do, and 
their character traits are also less well formed than adults'. Id. Children are more 
vulnerable than adults to psychological damage. Id. at 569-70. 
The biological and developmental differences in children lead to reasonable 
conclusions that children's misbehaviors are especially worthy of forgiveness, and 
that their characters are possible to redeem and reform. Roper at 569-70. The vast 
majority of children who engage in illegal and risky behaviors as adolescents grow out 
of them as they become adults. Id. Even for the most heinous of capital murders, we 
recognize that children do not weigh their actions prior to taking them as adults do, 
and thus their misbehavior is not as morally reprehensible. See id. See also, 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837-40 (1988) (plurality); Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, all to the same effect. 
12 See,~ National Institute on Drug Abuse, "DrugFacts: Marijuana," found 
at http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/ drugfacts/marijuana ("These effects 
include altered perceptions and mood, impaired coordination, difficulty with thinking 
and problem solving, and disrupted learning and memory. Marijuana also effects 
brain development, and when it is used heavily by young people, its effects on 
thinking and memory may last a long time or even be permanent."); Gottlieb, 
"Cannabis: A Danger to the Adolescent Brain - How Pediatricians Can Address 
Marijuana Use," found at http://ww\\7.mcpap.com/pdf/Cannibis.pdf. 
13 E.g. http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/26886186-418/even-casual-
marijuana-use-can-alter-the-brain-new-study-shows.html#.U5j8zo1dVU8. 
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detailed herein, Cooper's behavior was not violent or aggressive, and was less 
premeditated than the other participants'. The court's assessment of this factor 
attributed the misconduct of others to Cooper, see Point III. 
Counsel was objectively deficient in failing to assert ample evidence to 
challenge Christian Davidson's claim that the robbery was a home invasion robbery. 
Ryan Golding told the police that Davidson let the people in (R. 239), and swore that 
it was after one of them was showing Ryan his gun that someone else pulled a gun 
and began the robbery (R. 191). After the robbery, Golding counseled Davidson, 
"Stop bringing sketchy people over to your house," (R. 185), countering that this was 
a home invasion robbery. Davidson's mother made no claim of a forced entry or 
home invasion when she conveyed his allegations to the police (R. 174-78). Every 
defendant who confessed to the armed robbery described the entry into the home as 
consensual(~ R. 24, 27, 189, 237-38, 286). 
Davidson was the only person who made claims to the effect that the robbery 
began with a forced enu-y, and his claims about the supposed forced entry were 
inconsistent.14 He testified that it was only after Skinner pulled out his gun in the 
14 In his November 8, 2013, sworn typed "Roy City Police Department 
Statement of Witness," Davidson claimed that he heard the knocking, unlocked the 
door, and looked out the blind to see Dexter Skinner with his gun barrel visible, 
threatening to "bust a cap" if Christian did not let him in. But Christian also claimed 
the door was ajar and Dexter had his foot in it, blocking Christian from closing it. R. 
183-85. If the door had been ajar, there would have been no need for the Dexter to 
knock or Christian to unlock the door. 
In his separate handwritten sworn "Roy City Written Statemenf' from 
November 4, 2013, Christian claimed that he heard a knock, looked through the 
door, saw the barrel of a gun and heard a light skinned black man say, "Open the 
door or I'll pop this cap." Christian said he opened the door and was told to go 
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basement that he got very nervous and scared (R .. 252). His sworn statement to the 
police describes him participating in an amicable conversation about the propriety of 
touching another man's gun that occurred in the basement before the robbery began, 
and acknowledges that Christian was laughing and incredulous when the robbery 
began (R. 184). Counsel should have cross-examined Christian about the 
inconsistencies and about how Christian's claims about the forced entry may well 
have arisen from his need to engender sympathy with the police to minimize his own 
cr~al jeopardy for his drug dealing and running from them when they came to 
investigate the robbery (R. 180-82). He asked his mother not to report the robbery to 
the police for fear that he and his friends would be investigated for involvement in 
illegal drugs (R. 185). In addition to the false claim of a forced entry, Davidson told 
the police his wallet contained fifty dollars (R. 185), in contrast to originally telling his 
mother there was no cash in it (R. 17 4). He may have hoped to deflect blame from 
himself by exaggerating his claims of victimhood.15 · 
On the premeditation factor, Ryan's Golding's version of someone pulling the 
gun and initiating the robbety when Skinner was showing his gun to Ryan (R. 264-65) 
downstairs. But he made no claim of trying to close the door or the man sticking his 
foot in the door. R. 186-87. 
In his testimony at the SYO preliminary hearing, Davidson claimed that he 
opened the door after hearing a loud knock at which point Dexter Skinner was 
holding a gun by his side and someone said they were coming in, and someone put 
their foot in the door (R. 247). Then he testified that he opened the door slightly, at 
which point someone put a foot in the door and threatened to pop [a cap] (R. 261). 
15 People in trouble with the law often inculpate others to detract from the.it 
own liability. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 130-31 (1999); Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123, 126-28 (1968); and Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986). 
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conflicted with Christian's version, which implied that Wesley and Joshua pulled their 
guns only after people did not immediately obey Dexter when he initiated the 
robbery (R. 252). Counsel should have called Ryan to testify as to this important 
detail, as it was apparently Christian's version of the pulling of guns that led the judge 
to believe that the use of the guns was "well planned." (ll. 372-73). 
These were highly prejudicial objective deficiencies, for the juvenile court 
characterized this robbery as a forced entry home invasion robbery, and found that 
the forced entry and home invasion aspects of the robbety were aggravating in her 
assessment of the public interest in having Cooper transferred to the adult court (R. 
195-96). The court also focused on what the court believed was the "well planned" 
use of the guns (R. 372-73) in issuing the ·bindover order - when there was 
substantial evidence undermining the court's perceptions of a well-orchestrated home 
invasion robbeiy, as discussed above. 
4. Public Safety 
Counsel did not present any expert testimony or other information or specific 
argument to aid the juvenile court judge in assessing whether public safety was better 
served by retaining Cooper in the juvenile system. 
The results of psychological testing conducted by Dr. Matt Davies after 
Cooper was sent to prison and then transferred to the Daggett County Jail reflect that 
Cooper scored as na:ive and unsophisticated, a rule follower, rather than a rule 
breaker, lacking a history of impulsive or aggressive behavior, and appropriately 
empathetic and responsive to others' feelings (R. 410). His test scores show a low 
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risk for aggressive or violent behavior (R. 410). He had no elevated scores as are 
commonly seen with adolescents who have problems with violence, aggression, and 
non-compliance (R. 410). His testing shows no mental illness, although he may have 
been delayed in his ability to identify and express his feelings consistently (R.. 410). 
In discussing the crime during the evaluation, Cooper said he had no part in 
planning it, and when he found out what Wesley and Dexter planned to do, he knew 
it was wrong but did not know what to do (R. 411). He recognized the need to make 
amends for his criininal behavior, understood the impact of his and his co-
perpetrators' conduct on the victims, and ·wished that the crimes had never happened 
(R. 411). The evaluation explained that because of Cooper's age and possible mild 
developmental immaturity, he did not have a completely developed capacity to think 
through and anticipate consequences of his own actions (R. 412). While Cooper 
recognized in hindsight that he could have derailed the crime, his test data suggested 
that at the time of the offense, he did not have the emotional wherewithal to 
intercede (R.. 412-413). The evaluation noted studies showing that regions of the 
brain necessary to cognitive control are not yet developed in adolescents, and that 
social context heavily influences decision-making in adolescents, who are more prone 
to take risks to gain peer approval (R. 412 and n.21). 
The evaluation addressed the public safety interest in his retention in the 
juvenile court, explaining that juveniles incarcerated with adults are more likely to be 
physically and sexually abused while incarcerated, a higher incidence of mental illness, 
and are 7 .7 times more likely to commit suicide than juveniles held in juvenile 
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facilities. When released from adult facilities, such juveniles have significantly 
increased rate of recidivism (R. 412 and nn. 19-20). The evaluation concluded that if 
he were returned to the juvenile system, Cooper would benefit from the resources 
available there, and could grow intellectually, emotionally and physically in that less 
stressful environment (R. 413). As in Houskeeper, supra, Cooper was prejudiced by 
his counsel's failure to prepare with a necessary expert. 
5. Cooper's and the Public's Interest in Retention 
With regard to Cooper's and the public's interest in his remaining in the 
juvenile system, counsel presented no evidence or information to the court regarding 
the risks posed to minors in the adult system, and the effects of adult prosecution on 
their recidivism. He argued that Cooper would be a felon and under bad influences if 
he went into the adult system, although he might get a lighter sentence, and that 
counsel believed they could nip the serious crime in the bud by keeping him under 
the supervision of the juvenile system (PH 122-123). 
Counsel's argument and failure to provide evidence were objectively deficient. 
People sentenced to our prisons may be injured and killed.16 Utah does not comply 
with the Prison Rape Elimination Act standards designed to protect minors housed in 
adult facilities from sexual assault (R. 224-225). See 
http://ojp.gov/programs/pdfs/prea final rule.pdf, page 6. According findings 
16 See,~ Salt Lake Tribune, "Investigators Identify Utah Prison Inmates 
Involved in Fatal Fight," (detailing homicide of one inmate by another); Salt Lake 
Tribune, June 25, 2014, ccrnmate Stabbed in Gang Fight at Utah State Prison," 
(detailing stabbings of two inmates). 
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entered by Congress in conjunction with the enactment of PR.EA, juveniles housed in 
adult facilities are five times more hl~ely to be sexually assaulted than those housed in 
juvenile facilities, often within the first forty-eight hours of being incarcerated. 
"Public Law 108-79, September 4, 2003," Office of Juvenile and Delinquenq Programs, 
United States Department of Justice, September 4, 2003, found at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ79/PLAY-108publ79.pdf. Federal 
Prison Rape reporting law statistics show that the Utah State Prison has ranked 
among the least safe for inmates nationwide.17 As Dr. Davies indicated in his 
evaluation, juveniles who are housed with adults are 7.7 more likely than those 
housed with juveniles to commit suicide, and that juveniles housed with adults also 
have much higher rates of recidivism and physical and sexual abuse than juvenile 
offenders housed with juveniles. ~ R. 412, nn. 2 and 4. 
The warden's well-intended tempora11r solution of placing Cooper in solitary 
confinement (R.. 114-115) has well-known adverse side effects such as increased rates 
of suicide and psychosis, particularly given the developmental immaturity of juvenile 
offenders. See, ~ "Alone and Afraid: Children Housed in Solitary Confinement 
17 In 2007, the Utah State Prison was listed among the eleven facilities wherein 
the highest percentages of inmates experienced nonconsensual sex1:tal contact, see 
Table 5 in ht1:p://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svsfpri07.pdf). Current 
statistics on the Prison Rape Elimination Act specific to each state are apparently 
unavailable, but general statistics are grim. See generally 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=20. 2012 statistics show that 9.6 percent 
of incarcerated people were sexually assaulted in our counu-y's jails and prisons in 
2012; 7 .5 percent of prison inmates were molested; whereas 1.8 percent of jail 
inmates were, and that the rate of sexual assaults in prisons had increased from 4.8 
percent to 7.5 percent. See .h!.!.u://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdca12.pdf. It 
appears that lack of funding has limited the availability of more recent studies. See 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=278. 
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and Isolation in J uvcnile Detention and Correctional Facilities," CT une 2014), 
(!lliP-s://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Alone%20and%20Afraid%20COMPLETE%20F 
INAL.pdf). 
The foregoing information was key to the court's accurate assessment of the 
public's safety interests and general interests and Cooper's interest in his remaining in 
the juvenile system, and Cooper's lack of relative culpability and premeditation in his 
role in the offense. Counsel's failure to investigate and present the key law and 
evidence was objectively deficient, not strategic. Strickland. Particularly in light of 
the evidence presented at the hearing and the court's ruling, summarized herein, there 
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had counsel performed in an 
objectively reasonable fashion by investigating the facts and law and prepating the 
retention case. 
6. Failure to Challenge Prejudicial Hearsay 
Counsel was ineffective in failing to oppose prejudicial hearsay evidence. SYO 
preliminary hearings are unique and focus not only on probable cause, but also on 
retention in the juvenile court. They are presided over by juvenile court judges, not 
magistrates. See,~' M.C. v. State, supra, 916 P.2d at 917-918 (discussing why 
juvenile court judges presiding over SYO hearings are not considered magistrates 
under Utah R. Crim. P. 7). While hearsay is admissible as to probable cause, Utah R. 
Juv. P. 220), in the retention portion of the hearings, juveniles have the right to cross-
examine adverse witnesses, Utah R. Juv. P. 23A(d). While the rules contemplate two 
separate phases of such hearings, in practice, the retention factors pertaining to the 
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minor's relative culpability, and the extent to which his role was violent, aggressive or 
premeditated, are often and naturally addressed in the probable cause portion of the 
hearing wherein the crimes are proved. 
Much of the most damaging evidence was hearsay as to Cooper, whose SYO 
preliminary hea1-ing was held jointly with Joshua Dutson's without objection by 
Cooper's counsel. Much of the hearsay came from co-defendants and others who 
were in deep trouble with the law themselves, and had the resultant need to curry 
favor with the police and prosecuting authorities by inculpating others. As a result of 
the bias that is engendered in such situations, their statements were unreliable as a 
matter of law. See,~' Lillv, B1uton and Lee, supra. Counsel should have objected 
to the joint preliminary hearings of Cooper and Joshua, and objected to the hearsay, 
particularly that from constitutionally unreliable witnesses, or subpoenaed them for 
cross-examination. 
For instance, Detective Barker testified without objection that there were 
multiple robberies that day, wherein the five suspects had robbed multiple victims of 
cologne, a leather jacket, and marijuana, supposedly in Ogden, North Ogden, 
Harrisville, and Roy (R. 285-86). Trial counsel did not object to the hearsay 
embodied in this testimony or clarify that only Dexter Skinner and Wesley Brow11 
were charged in other robberies (R. 167-73), and that Cooper was not 
The rules of evidence generally apply in juvenile court. See Utah R. Juv. P. 43. 
The assertions regarding the other robberies qualified as hearsay tl1at was not 
admissible to show probable cause for the crimes at issue in this preliminaty hearing, 
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and should have been excluded under Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 23A(d), supra, 
and Utah R. Evidence 801(c)(1) and (2) (defining hearsay as a statement made by the 
declarant outside of court and admitted by a party to prove the truth of the assertion 
in the statement); Rule 802 (excluding hearsay). Under Utah Rules of Evidence 401 
through 404, before such evidence of extrinsic crimes was admitted, the Government 
should have shown a proper non-character purpose for the evidence, which should 
have been relevant to a material fact, and the probative value of the evidence should 
not have been exceeded by its potential for prejudice. See,~-, State v. Decorso, 993 
P.2d 837 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000). Evidence of the other crimes 
was not admitted for any proper non-character purpose, was not relevant to any 
material fact, and was hugely prejudicial to Cooper. The prejudice stemming from 
such evidence is recognized as a matter of law. E.g., Huddleston v. United States, 
485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988). 
The detective summarized Joshua's allegation.s about the charged robbery, 
wherein Joshua initially claimed that Cooper had a gun during the robbery, and then 
said Cooper had a switchblade (R. 284). He also read Joshua Dutson's 1102 
statement into the record to the effect that they all agreed on Wesley's plan before 
going to Christian Davidson's, without any hearsay objection from Cooper's counsel 
(R. 282-89). Given Joshua's motive to exculpate himself by inculpating others, 
counsel should have objected to this unreliable hearsay. ~ Lilly, Lee and Biuton, 
supra. 
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Counsel's failures to investigate, research and present Cooper's retention case 
are not properly characterized as strategy, as lawyers cannot make valid strategic 
decisions absent reasonably necessary and thorough investigation of the facts and the 
law. E.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
Particularly when the evidence and law discussed above that were omitted or 
mishandled by counsel are compared to the information presented at the SYO 
hearing and the juvenile court's ruling, discussed herein, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result had counsel properly investigated and presented 
Cooper's case for retention. Cf. Houskeeper, supra . 
III. THE JUVENILE COURTS MISINTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
AMENDED SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER STATUTE 
REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
A. COOPER'S RELATIVE CULPABILI1YWAS THE 
LOWEST AMONG THE DEFENDANTS' . 
SYO cases necessarily involve violent crimes. 18 Courts must compare the 
relative culpability of the participants to dete1'mine whether a child should be retained 
in the protective confines of the juvenile court. See State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, 
if 29, 79 P .3d 951, supra. Under 78A-6-702( c)(ii) (2013), because there were multiple 
perpetrators, the court should have assessed whether Cooper appeared "to have a 
greater or lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants.'' 
18 The SYO act applies to aggravated arson, aggravated assault with serious 
bodily injury, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, 
aggravated sexual assault, felony discharge of a fireru.m, attempted aggravated murder, 
attempted murder, and felony-level weapons offenses committed by juveniles with 
prior convictions of that type. 
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The court found Cooper's culpability significant, but did not articulate the 
culpability of the defendants other than Cooper for purposes of comparison and did 
not actually find whether Cooper had a greater or lesser degree of culpability in 
comparison to all the others involved in the crime (R. 19 5). 
Without carefully comparing Cooper's culpability to the co-defendants', the 
court was in no position to make a meaningful assessment of whether Cooper should 
remain in juvenile court. As explained in Point II B 2, above, the relative culpability 
factor should have weighed heavily in favor of Cooper's retention in juvenile court 
In the court's oral ruling, despite the fact that Joshua brandished a gun that 
came from Tomek Perkins during the robbery, the court found that Cooper's 
involvement was greater than Joshua's because the guns came from Cooper's home 
and the use of the guns was "well planned." (R. 372-73). The court found this in the 
marked absence of reliable evidence that Cooper had anything to do with any 
planned or spontaneous use of the guns by Joshua and the other two defendants who 
used them during the robbery.19 But see,~ Lara (requiring courts to distinguish 
and focus on role of the individual juvenile in assessing retention factors). 
The court did not require an evaluation of Cooper prior to sending him to 
adult court, although Cooper's father complained at a detention hearing that no one 
19 The evidence as to use of guns was Davidson's allegation that the two 
gunmen aside from Skinner pulled their guns out after Davidson laughed and asked if 
Skinner was kidding when Skinner pulled his gun and began the robbery (R. 252-53, 
310) -- a series of events that appears unpredictable and unplanned. In contrast, 
Ryan Golding's 1102 statement, read into the record, indicated that a second person 
began the robbery by pulling his gun when Skinner was showing Golding Skinner's 
gun (R. 264-65). 
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had investigated Cooper's character or contacted his parents, family or friends to see 
who he is, and the court indicated that probation would be required to do so for the 
future detention hearings (I'. 11/25/13). Had the court required a psychological 
evaluation, evidence was readily available that Cooper was developmentally 
susceptible to peer pressure, given his level of maturity and development. See Dr. 
Davies' evaluation (R. 406). An evaluation would have confirmed that Cooper's 
relative culpability was the lowest among the defendants involved in the robbe1-y. Id. 
The court made no mention of the facts that Cooper was the youngest and second to 
the smallest defendant and the least developmentally equipped to be making good 
decisions, given his youth, who was further impaired by his marijuana use.20 
B. COOPER'S ROLE IN THE OFFENSE WAS NOT 
VIOLENT OR AGGRESSIVE AND WAS NOT HIGHLY 
PREMEDITATED. 
All crimes in SYO cases are violent, aggressive and usually premeditated to a 
degree. Courts must focus on the role of the individual child and consider the extent 
to which the role was violent, aggressive or premeditated in determining whether to 
retain them in juvenile court. E.g. Lara, supra. In the court's ruling on the extent to 
which Cooper's role in the offense was committed in a violent, aggressive or 
20 See,~' R. 406 (Dr. Davies' evaluation) and National Institute on Drug 
Abuse, "DrugFacts: Marijuana," found at 
http://\vww.drugabuse.gov/ publications/ drugfacts/ marijuana ("These effects 
include altered perceptions and mood, impaired coordination, difficulty with thinking 
and problem solving, and disrupted learning and memory. Marijuana also affects 
brain development, and when it is used heavily by young people, its effects on 
thinking and memory may last a long time or even be permanent."). 
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premeditated manner, the court repeatedly attributed the violent and aggressive 
actions of others to Cooper because he provided the guns they used (R. 195-96). 
Had the court not misinterpreted but instead properly applied the statutory 
language, the result would have been different, as the evidence showed that Cooper's 
role in the offense was not violent or aggressive. There was no testimony that 
Cooper was one of the people who showed a gun prior to entering the house, put his 
foot in the door, or told Davidson he had to let them in and to go downstairs. 
Cooper's role was so minimal that Christian Davidson believed there were only three 
people involved in the robbery (T. 12/20/13: 8, 10),'when there were actually four 
While he ambivalently identified Cooper as the third gunman who collected the 
wallets (f. 12/20/13: 14, 72), Joshua Dutson admitted to being the third gunman (f. 
12/20/13: 45). The court found insufficient evidence that Cooper brandished any 
weapon during the entire offense (R. 195). 
There is no evidence that Cooper threatened anyone in any way. Cooper's 
liability for the offenses was accomplice liability, based on his presence and provision 
of two of the three guns used by others in the robbery. The court should have 
focused on Cooper's actual role during the offense in assessing his level of violence, 
aggression and premeditation, rather than holding him accountable for the violent 
and aggressive actions of his co-perpet.rators. Compare Lara, M.E.P., 
and F.L.R., supra. 
As for premeditation, the court ruled that there were several steps in this 
robbeq, and that Cooper could have extricated himself from it before it occurred (R. 
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374). Rather than proceeding by assumption, the Court should have obtained a 
psychological evaluation, for Cooper's adolescent brain was biologically less able to 
anticipate the consequences of his actions, and he was developmentally not equipped 
to extricate himself from the robbery despite knowing it was wrong. E.g. R. 406. 
While Joshua Dutson told the police that everyone was aware of the plan that Wesley 
created, there was no evidence presented that Cooper was involved in the actual 
planning of the robbery of Christian Davidson and Ryan Golding. The text message 
conversation between Joshua and Skinner shows that they were scheming to get 
Cooper's father's guns the night before when Joshua invited Cooper to participate in 
a separate text message conversation (R. 295-96, 450), and Wesley Brown planned the 
robbery of Davidson, as he had previously lived in that home with him and knew he 
would have drugs (R. 282-83, 306). Thus, the premeditation was primarily done by 
the older, more sophisticated defendants and Cooper's role was less premeditated. 
C. THE PUBLIC SAFE'IY INTEREST CALLED FOR 
COOPER'S RETENTION IN THE JUVENILE COURT. 
The juvenile court's public safety analysis (R.. 196) echoed the outdated 
thinking of M.E.P. and A.B., supra, that public safety is best served by moving Serious 
Youth Offenders into the adult system, where potential sentences no1mally exceed 
the limited years of jurisdiction remaining in the juvenile court. The court may well 
have ruled differently had the court been aware of the purpose for the amendments 
to the Serious Youtl1 Offender Act - to ensure that first time offenders such as 
Cooper are rehabilitated in juvenile court, rather than criminalized, stigmatized and 
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released quickly and without treatment in the adult system, to recidivate more 
violently in the future, supra. 
The court's public safety analysis largely turned on the serious nature of the 
offenses charged, and the potential volatility and hypothetical threats they can pose to 
perpetrators, the police and the public, given that others may respond violently to 
such crimes (R. 196). This general and hypothetical approach would ostensibly lead 
to transfer in all SYO cases, which by nature involve violent crimes that can prompt 
violent responses and pose th.teats to law enforcement and members of the public. 
The court's belief that the crimes charged here are among the most serious in our 
community similarly did not take into account the range of offenses subject to 
retention under the SYO statute, which contemplates that retention in juvenile court 
may be appropriate for even more se110us offenses involving intended and actual, 
rather than potential, serious injuries or intended death to the victims. In 
characterizing the crime as a dangerous breach of the sanctity of the home, the court 
did not recognize that aggravated burglaries and robberies are among the crimes that 
routinely result in SYO prosecutions under the statute, and that those minors who 
commit such offenses are nonetheless subject to retention in the juvenile court 
pursuant to the plain te1ms of§ 78a-6-702 (2013). Nor did the court account for the 
facts that the guns were not loaded, and that the robbery began after an amicable 
conversation that Christian Davidson and Ryan Golding acknowledged occurred in 
the basement before the robbery (R. 184, 264-65), countering the notion of a home 
invasion robbery. 
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In assessing the public's safety interest in Cooper's being prosecuted in adult 
or juvenile court, the court did not requite an evaluation of Cooper by a psychologist, 
and assumed from the facts of this case that there was a great likelihood of further 
injury and harm. With a professional evaluation, the court could have had a solid 
evidentiary basis for assessing the low risk of future harm posed by Cooper, his 
amenability to reform, and the public safety interest in keeping Cooper in the juvenile 
system (R.. 406-12). 
The court held it against Cooper that he came from a loving family and good 
home, because he chose to commit the crimes despite his fortunate upbringing (R. 
196). The court did not consider that Cooper's upbringing and complete lack of 
juvenile history demonstrated that the robbery was a significant aberration from his 
law-abiding life \Vhich suggested that his caring parents would successfully aid him in 
reforming during the five years he could remain in the juvenile system if he were 
retained. The court concluded that Cooper needed a longer correctional period than 
the five years the juvenile system could provide, despite his complete absence of prior 
history and his good home, and his relatively minor and nonviolent role in the crime, 
and the change in the SYO law to counteract such thinking. 
D. COOPER LACKED A QUALIFYING PRIOR WEAPON-
RELATED OFFENSE AND I-IAD NO PRIOR OFFENSES. 
The court ruled twice that Cooper had no prior record in the juvenile court, 
without separately recognizing one of the actual statuto1-y criteria: that he had no 
prior weapons-related offense that would have been _a felony had he committed one 
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(R. 194, 196), see Utah Code Ann. § 781\-6-702(c)(i), supra. This is important because 
it demonstrates the egregious type of juvenile history that might normally justify 
transferring a minor into the adult court, which Cooper did not have. His complete 
lack of a prior history in juvenile court should have weighed heavily and separately in 
favor of retention. See House Bill 105 and legislative history, in the addendum. 
E. COOPER'S AND THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST IN 
RETENTION IN JUVENILE COURT WERE HIGH. 
The court perfunctorily found by clear and convincing evidence it was not in 
Cooper's best interest to be prosecuted in adult court, and it was in the public's best 
interest for him to be transferred to the adult court (R. 197) The court should have 
expressly considered the reformative benefits available to Cooper in juvenile court, in 
contrast to the risks posed to and harms that befall minors such as Cooper when they 
go into the adult system, and how retaining Cooper in the juvenile system served the 
public interest, as discussed above. 
F. THE COURT'S RULINGS PREJUDICED COOPER AND 
ESTABLISH PREJUDICE FROM THE FAILURE TO 
SELF-RECUSE. 
Because all the retention factors should have weighed in favor of Cooper's 
retention in juvenile court, there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result 
in the absence of the errors. As a result of the individual and cumulative prejudice 
from the errors, reversal is in order. See F.L., 2015 UT App 224, 1 32 (reversing 
SYO bindover ruling because in the absence of the juvenile court's misinterpretation 
and misapplication of multiple retention factors, there was a reasonable probability of 
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retention). As there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had the 
court been apprised of the relevant evidence and law, and had the court followed the 
law, Cooper has proved prejudice under the plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel doctrines. See Verde, supra. 
The court's legal errors also prove prejudice from the failure to self-recuse, 
assuming this were necessary. The judge's legal errors in the bindover decision satisfy 
the abuse of discretion standard, which encompasses errors of law. See, ~' State v. 
Barrett, 2005 UT 88,~~ 15-17, 127 P.3d 692 (review for abuse of discretion includes 
review for errors of law). Under Alonzo, prejudice is shown because of the abuse of 
discretion, because Cooper's substantial rights were affected, and because there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had the judge recused hetself. Id. 
932 P.2d 606, 611-612 (Utah 1\pp. 1997). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm Van Huizen, and is urged to do so expeditiously. 
Cooper will turn twenty years old on July 29, 2017. While counsel for Cooper 
concedes nothing on this point, the juvenile court may well lose jurisdiction over him 
in the event the case remains tied up in the appellate courts until he turns twenty-one. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78a-6-103(1)(A)21 ; State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, 63 P.3d 
21 Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-103 provides in relevant part: 
78A-6-103. Jurisdiction of juvenile court -- Original -- Exclusive. 
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667 (affirming district court ruling that juvenile court lost jurisdiction over 
defendant's juvenile offenses when the defendant turned twenty-one). 
Respectfully submitted this ~f ~' 2017. 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
According to the wordcount function of the Word program I am using, the 
portions of this brief that count toward the word cowk°ntain 13,999 words. 
Respectfully submitted this H- of ~ i I\, , 2017. 
ooper Van Huizen 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenil~ court has exclusive original 
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning: 
(a) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance 
or a person younger than 21 years of age who has violated any law or 
ordinance before becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the violation 
occurred, excluding offenses in Subsection 78A-7-106(2)(.] 
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copies of to be printed, bound and mailed, along with a compact disc containing a 
searchable PDF of this brief and the addenda, to the Criminal Appeals Division of 
the Utah Attorney General's Office, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854. 
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JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE J. 
FREDERIC VOROS JR. and SENIOR JUDGE RUSSELL W. BENCH 
concurred.1 
ROTH, Judge: 
'1(1 Cooper John Anthony Van Huizen was involved in an 
aggravated robbery when he was sixteen years old. The State 
charged him in juvenile court under the Serious Youth Offender 
Act. After a hearing, the juvenile court bound Van Huizen over 
to stand trial as an adult in district court as provided by the Act, 
and he appeals. We vacate and remand for further proceedings. 
1. Senior Judge Russell W. Bench sat by special assignment as 
authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6). 
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State v. Van Huizen 
BACKGROUND2 
i2 In late 2013, Van Huizen committed a robbery with a 
friend and some acquaintances. At sixteen, Van Huizen was the 
youngest of the group; his friend was also a juvenile and their 
three acquaintances were adults. Although Van Huizen did not 
orchestrate the robbery, he agreed to it and facilitated the plan 
by providing guns from his family home. 
<_[3 In search of drugs, the group drove to the house of 
someone they knew would possess marijuana. They knocked on 
the back door, gained entry to the house and, brandishing the 
guns taken from Van Huizen's home, proceeded to rob the 
occupant of a cell phone, some cash, and a "little bit of weed." 
Though Van Huizen did not carry a firearm or other weapon, he 
was part of the group that entered the home and committed the 
robbery. 
<_[4 The State charged Van Huizen under the then-current 
Serious Youth Offender Act (the Act). See generally Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-6-702 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (outlining the process 
by which a juvenile could be ''bound over and held to answer in 
the district court in the same manner as an adult"). 3 The Act 
required that the State charge any minor accused of certain 
serious felony offenses by filing a criminal information in 
2. Van Huizen has already been convicted as an adult in district 
court. After his conviction, he successfully moved to reinstate 
the time to appeal the juvenile court's bindover order. Thus, this 
appeal concerns juvenile court proceedings and, on appeal, we 
recite the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's 
decision. See In re J.C., 2016 UT App 10, n.3, 366 P.3d 867. 
3. The Utah Legislature amended the Act after the State brought 
these charges. We address the Act as it existed at the time of Van 
Huizen' s juvenile court proceedings in 2013. 
20140602-CA 2 2017 UT App 30 
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State v. Van Huizen 
juvenile court. Id. § 78A-6-702(1). Once filed, the Act directed the 
court to l,l.Ildertake a two-pronged analysis. First, the State had 
"to establish probable cause" that the defendant committed the 
crime. Id. § 78A-6-702(3)(a). If the State proved probable cause, 
the burden shifted to the defendant to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that "it would be contrary to the best 
interest of the minor and the best interests of the public to bind 
the defendant over." Id. § 78A-6-702(3)(d), (e). 
<J{S In making the ultimate determination on whether to bind 
the juvenile over to district court, the Act directed that "the 
judge shall consider only" five factors: 
(i) whether the minor has been previously 
adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving the 
use of a dangerous weapon which would be a 
felony if committed by an adult; 
(ii) if the offense was committed with one or more 
other persons, whether the minor appears to have a 
greater or lesser degree of culpability than the 
codefendants; 
(iii) the extent to which the minor's role in the 
offense was committed in a violent, aggressive, or 
premeditated manner; 
(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior 
adjudications in the juvenile court; and 
(v) whether public safety is better served by 
adjudicating the minor in the juvenile court or in 
the district court. 
Id.§ 78A-6-702(3)(c). 
<JI6 Under that framework, the Weber County Attorney's 
Office, acting on behalf of the State, charged Van Huizen in 
juvenile court with two counts of aggravated robbery and one 
count of aggravated burglary, all first degree felonies. 
Unbeknown to Van Huizen and his parents, the juvenile court 
20140602-CA 3 2017 UT App 30 
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State v. Van Huizen 
judge assigned to his case was married to the then-Chief 
Criminal Deputy in the Weber County Attorney's Office. 
<_[7 The juvenile court determined that the State had met its 
initial burden of proof and that there was probable cause to bind 
Van Huizen over to the district court as an adult. In response, 
Van Huizen put on evidence that both his and the public's 
interests were both best served by remaining in the juvenile 
system. Van Huizen and the State stipulated to factors one and 
four, namely that he had no prior offenses and therefore no 
offenses involving a dangerous weapon. On the other factors, 
Van Huizen adduced testimony from his mother and father 
relating to the stability of his home life, his generally good 
nature, and his bright future. 
<j{8 The juvenile court considered the evidence and 
determined that Van Huizen had only carried half of his burden. 
While Van Huizen had shown that his best interest was served 
by remaining in juvenile court, he had not shown by clear and 
convincing evidence that the public interests also favored 
retention. The court bound Van Huizen over to district court. 
Van Huizen did not timely appeal the bindover decision. 
'119 In district court, the same deputy county attorney that 
had handled the juvenile proceedings continued to prosecute 
Van Huizen, and the attorney received at least some assistance 
from the juvenile judge's husband, the Chief Criminal Deputy in 
the prosecutor's office. Van Huizen eventually pleaded guilty to 
two reduced counts of robbery, both second degree felonies. The 
district court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of one to 
fifteen years. He was paroled in November 2014. 
':IllO While he was serving his prison sentence, Van Huizen 
retained new counsel and moved in district court to reinstate his 
time to appeal the juvenile court's bind over order under 
Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628. He supported the 
motion by alleging that he had been denied his right to appeal 
the bindover order through ineffective assistance of counsel, 
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asserting that trial counsel had 11misinformed [him] that the time 
for appeal had run" when it in fact had not. The State stipulated 
to Van Huizen's motion, and the district court reinstated his time 
to file an appeal. On that basis, Van Huizen now appeals the 
juvenile court's bind over order that initially transferred him into 
district court. 4 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ci[ll Van Huizen argues that the juvenile judge who bound 
him over was required to recuse herself under the Code of 
Judicial Conduct. "Determining whether a trial judge committed 
error by failing to recuse himself or herself under the Utah Code 
of Judicial Conduct ... is a question of law, and we review such 
questions for correctness." State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 
(Utah 1998). Van Huizen also argues that the judge's "risk of 
bias" in his case was so strong that it "violated due process" 
under the United States Constitution. "Constitutional issues, 
including questions regarding due process, are questions of law 
that we review for correctness." In re E.K.S., 2016 UT 56, <jf 5 
( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
4. We note that, because Van Huizen's time to appeal the 
juvenile court's bindover decision was reinstated after it lapsed, 
he is taking this appeal on a more developed record than would 
normally be available. Specifically, we have before us a district 
court record that contains briefing, declarations, and other 
materials that were not part of the juvenile court proceedings 
and therefore would not have been available had this appeal 
been taken immediately following the bindover decision. This 
point is particularly salient as it applies to our resolution of this 
case, which turns on record information that-because of its 
introduction in district court after the bindover hearing-would 
have been unavailable to us had Van Huizen' s appeal arrived in 
this court under the usual tirneline. 
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112 Additionally, Van Huizen asserts that ineffective 
assistance of c01;msel and the doctrine of plain error require that 
we reverse the bindover order. Because we resolve this case on 
the disqualification issue, we do not address Van Huizen's other 
arguments. 
ANALYSIS 
113 Van Huizen argues that the juvenile court judge (the 
Juvenile Judge) who bound him over into adult court should 
have disqualified herself from his case because she was married 
to the Chief Criminal Deputy in charge of the criminal division 
in the Weber County Attorney's Office, the office that prosecuted 
him. He argues first that the Code of Judicial Conduct required 
the Juvenile Judge to recuse herself. Second, Van Huizen argues 
that he was denied .constitutional due process due to the acute 
"risk of bias" inherent in the Juvenile Judge's relationship with 
the prosecuting office. The "general rule [is] that courts should 
avoid reaching constitutional issues if the case can be decided on 
other grounds." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 
(Utah 1994). We therefore address the Code of Judicial Conduct 
first, and because we resolve the appeal on that ground, we do 
not reach the constitutional question. 
I. The Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 
<_{[14 The Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[a]n 
independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our 
system of justice." Utah Code Jud. Conduct, Preamble. As Justice 
Felix Frankfurter observed, courts possess "neither the purse nor 
the sword," so their authority "ultimately rests on sustained 
public confidence in [their] moral sanction.11 Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). That core 
principle is enshrined in our caselaw: "The purity and integrity 
of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint of 
suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have the 
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highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts." 
Haslam v. lvforrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1948). 
<j[15 The Code lists the conditions under which a judge must 
recuse or disqualify himself or herself.5 Generally, "[a] judge 
should act at all times in a manner that promotes-and shall not 
undermine-public confidence in the independence, integrity, 
and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and 
the appearance of impropriety." Utah Code Jud. Conduct R. 1.2. 
Specifically, "[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any 
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned." 6 Id. R. 2.11(A); accord Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 
<j[ 49 (" A judge should be disqualified when circumstances arise 
in which the judge's 'impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.111 (quoting State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 
1989))). 
<j[16 Rule 2.ll(A) contains an illustrative, but not exhaustive, 
list of disqualifying circumstances. In some circumstances, the 
judge's duty to recuse is absolute. For instance, if "[t]he judge 
has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's 
lawyer," he or she must disqualify. Utah Code Jud. Conduct R. 
2.ll(A)(l); see also id. R. 2.ll(C) (establishing that the presence of 
actual bias or prejudice cannot be waived). In other 
5. The terms "recuse" and "disqualify" are generally 
synonymous. See In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F .2d 764, 769 
n.1 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Whether or not there was ever a distinction 
between disqualification and recusal, the courts now commonly 
use the two terms interchangeably."). 
6. The Code of Judicial Conduct defines "impartial" to mean the 
"absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular 
parties or classes of parties, as well as presence of an objective 
and open mind in considering matters that come before a judge." 
Utah Code Jud. Conduct, Terminology . 
20140602-CA 7 2017 UT App 30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Van Huizen 
circumstances, the judge must recuse unless he or she "disclose[ s] 
on the record the basis of the judge's disqualification" and "the 
parties and lawyers agree . . . that the judge should not be 
disqualified." Id. R. 2.ll(C). If the parties agree to such a waiver, 
it "shall be incorporated into the record of the proceeding." Id. 
'1[17 Circumstances requiring disqualification absent waiver 
include: 
The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse 
or domestic partner, or a person within the third 
degree of relationship to either of them, or the 
spouse or domestic partner of such a person is: 
(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, 
director, general partner, managing member, or 
trustee of a party; 
(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(c) a person who has more than a de minimis 
interest that could be substantially affected by 
the proceeding .... 
Id. R. 2.ll(A)(2). Further, a judge "is disqualified whenever the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless 
of whether any of the specific [listed disqualifying circumstances] 
apply." Id. R. 2.11 cmt. 1. And the judge bears ultimate 
responsibility for ensuring that the integrity of the process is 
protected: "A judge's obligation not to hear or decide matters in 
which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether 
a motion to disqualify is filed." Id. R. 2.11 cmt 2; accord Regional 
Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 257 n.7 (Utah 1992) 
(holding that it "was [the judge's] responsibility to identify her 
relationship ... and take appropriate measures to recuse herself," 
not the responsibility of counsel). 
'1[18 Thus, when a judge knows of circumstances that give rise 
to the reasonable appearance of bias, the judge is under an 
affirmative duty either to recuse or to disclose the facts that 
contribute to an appearance of partiality and allow the parties to 
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decide whether to waive disqualification. Indeed, "[a] judge 
should disclose on the record information that the judge believes 
the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant 
to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge 
believes there is no basis for disqualification." Utah Code Jud. 
Conduct R. 2.11 cmt. 5. Hence, even if the judge believes that 
recusal is not warranted under a given set of circumstances, it is 
better to disclose facts that might reasonably raise a question 
about impartiality and allow the parties to either waive the issue 
or file a motion for disqualification that will then be resolved by 
an independent judicial officer. See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(2) 
( explaining that a motion to disqualify must either be granted or 
referred to a different judicial officer for disposition). 
<_[19 "The Utah Supreme Court has found the provisions of the 
Code C?f Judicial Conduct to have legal force." American Rural 
Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Commc'n Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 195 n.12 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also Cheek v. Clay Bulloch Constr. Inc., 
2016 UT App 227, <_[ 19, 387 P.3d 611 (collecting cases). For 
instance, in Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, the supreme 
court held that an appearance of impropriety under the Judicial 
Code of Conduct "[was] sufficient to dispose of the case." 830 
P.2d at 257-58. 
120 In Utah law, as under federal law, the question of a 
judge's impartiality is determined from the viewpoint of '" a 
reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances."' West Jordan 
City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, <j[ 22, 135 P.3d 874 (quoting 13A 
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3549 (2d ed. 1984 & supp. 2005)).7 
7. The federal analogue to the Code of Judicial Conduct is 
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012). Although the Utah rules and 
the federal statute do not use identical language, "[s]ection 
455(a)," like the Utah code, "is based upon the [ABA Model] 
Code of Judicial Conduct, which clearly imposes a 'reasonable 
(continued ... ) 
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As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
explained, "The reasonable observer is not the judge or even 
someone familiar with the judicial system, but rather an average 
member of the public." Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc., 787 
F.3d 1297, 1310 (10th Cir. 2015). "In conducting this [reasonable 
person] review, we must ask how these facts would appear to a 
well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer, rather than [a] 
hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person." Id. (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
ci[21 We now turn to the question in this case-whether there 
was a reasonable question as to the impartiality of the Juvenile 
Judge under the circumstances. If so, we must then determine 
whether the appearance of partiality requires vacatur of the 
bindover order and reconsideration by another judge. 
A. Appearance of Partiality 
ci[22 We note at the outset that our thorough review of the 
record gives us no reason to think the Juvenile Judge was 
actually biased against Van Huizen. However, as we discussed 
above, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge's 
disqualification under many circumstances that fall short of 
actual bias, such as situations where a reasonable person would 
question the judge's impartiality. In this case, it is uncontested 
that the Juvenile Judge that bound Van Huizen over for 
prosecution in district court was married to the Chief Criminal 
Deputy in the Weber County Attorney's Office. It is also 
uncontested that the Juvenile Judge did not disclose that 
information to the parties on the record. 
( ... continued) 
person' test for recusal." 13D Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3549 
(3d ed. supp. 2016). Thus, we consider federal cases addressing 
the "reasonable person" standard helpful to our analysis. 
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<J{23 Van Huizen argues that the spousal relationship required 
the Juvenile Judge to disqualify herself under rule 2.11. The rule 
requires recusal where, among other things, the judge's spouse 
is "a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general 
partner, managing member, or trustee of a party." Utah Code 
Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A)(2)(a). Van Huizen asserts that the Chief 
Criminal Deputy was "properly considered an officer, director 
or managing member of a party" -in this case, the State. Van 
Huizen does not, however, explain that argument in detail. He 
apparently relies instead on the plain language, arguing that the 
Chief Criminal Deputy obviously was among the class of people 
denoted in rule 2.11 for which a spousal relationship with the 
judge created the appearance of partiality. 
'Il24 The State argues in response that the Chief Criminal 
Deputy was not covered under the plain language of the rule. 
because he was not "an 'officer, director, general partner, 
managing member, or trustee' of the State of Utah in the sense 
that those terms are used in rule 2.11." The State does not 
explain precisely in what sense the rule uses those terms, but the 
point seems to be based on the distinction between government 
entities and corporate entities. That is, terms such as "general 
partner," "managing member," and "trustee" suggest positions 
within a private entity or corporate structure, not within a 
government body. Accordingly, the State's position appears to 
be the inverse of Van Huizen's-that the Chief Criminal 
Deputy's position is categorically outside the scope of rule 
2.ll(A)(2)(a). 
<J{25 We are not persuaded that the plain language of rule 
2.ll(A)(2)(a) answers the question presented. Taking just one 
term as an example, "officer" applies to both governments and 
private entities. For instance, "officer" is defined broadly as 
"anyone elected or appointed to an office or position of authority 
in a government, business, institution, society, etc." Officer, 
Webster's New World College Dictionary 1015 (5th ed. 2016). 
Similarly, Black's defines "officer" as "[s]omeone who holds an 
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office of trust, authority, or command." Officer, Black's Law 
Dictionary 1257 (10th ed. 2014) (explaining that, in public affairs, 
an officer is someone who holds a public government office and 
is "authorized by that government to exercise some specific 
function"). These definitions make clear the concept of an 
"officer" is broader than the State acknowledges and could 
apply to a position like the Chief Criminal Deputy's. 
<J[26 But on the other hand, the plain language of rule 
2.11(A)(2)(a) does not clearly apply to the Chief Criminal Deputy 
either. While the Chief Criminal Deputy is undoubtedly 
authorized by the government to "exercise a specific function," it 
is unclear whether he was "elected or appointed" to his position 
of authority as understood by the term's definition. For instance, 
it is likely that the Weber County Attorney-the Chief Criminal 
Deputy's boss-would be properly considered an officer under 
the plain meaning of the term. Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-101(1) 
(LexisNexis 2013) ( enumerating the county attorney as one of the 
"elected officers of a county"). However, it does not 
automatically follow that the Weber County Attorney's Chief 
Criminal Deputy is likewise an officer of the State for purposes 
of the rule. 
<j127 We are not persuaded that rule 2.11(A)(2)(a)' s language 
either plainly applies or plainly does not apply to the Chief 
Criminal Deputy. Rather, rules 2.11(A)(2)(b) and (c), which 
trigger recusal when a judge's spouse is "acting as a lawyer in 
the proceeding" or "has more than a de minimis interest that 
could be substantially affected by the proceeding," seem more 
applicable. Relevant cases have often employed these concepts 
in addressing similar conditions, and we accordingly now 
consider how disqualification rules have been addressed in like 
circumstances. In doing so, we keep in mind a consideration we 
discussed earlier-that the disqualification rule is meant to be 
applied broadly "whenever the judge's impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the 
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specific [listed disqualifying circumstances] apply .11 Utah Code 
Jud. Conduct R. 2.11 cmt. 1. 
1. Applicable Caselaw 
128 We are aware of no published Utah decisions that analyze 
a relationship like the one at issue here, where the judge is 
closely related to an attorney who is not directly involved in the 
proceedings before the judge, but is nonetheless a supervisor in 
the public law office of the attorney handling the case in court. In 
the absence of Utah precedent, Van Huizen directs our attention 
to a Colorado case, Smith v. Beckman, 683 P.2d 1214 (Colo. App. 
1984). In Beckman, a county court judge was married to a deputy 
district attorney who "handle[d] matters exclusively in the 
district court," a separate court from the judge's own. Id. at 1215. 
The criminal defendant in Beckman, originally scheduled for trial 
in county court before the county judge, requested a writ from 
the district court to prevent the county judge from presiding 
over his trial. He argued that the judge's spousal relationship to 
a prosecutor justified disqualification. Id. Even though the 
attorney spouse was not an active lawyer on the case, the district 
court found that "the powers of a deputy district attorney are 
akin to that of a partner in a private law firm, 11 and thus the 
judge's recusal was necessary. Id. 
<j[29 On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected that 
analysis and held that a deputy district attorney is not like a 
partner at a law firm "because his compensation and clientele 
are set, and the prestige of the office as a whole is not greatly 
affected by the outcome of a particular case." Id. at 1216. 
However, the court nevertheless held "that the husband-wife 
relationship" required recusal. Id. at 1215. The court reasoned 
that, 
Generally, the public views married people as II a 
couple," as "a partnership," and as participants in 
a relationship more intimate than any other kind of 
relationship between individuals. In our view the 
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existence of a marriage relationship between a 
judge and a deputy district attorney in the same 
· county is sufficient to establish grounds for 
disqualification, even though no other facts call 
into question the judge's impartiality. 
Id. at 1216. The appellate court reached that conclusion even 
though the county judge and the district attorney "[had] drafted 
guidelines designed to further insulate [the attorney spouse] 
from all contact with any county court cases." Id. at 1215. Thus, 
the Beckman court determined that the spousal relationship is so 
close in nature that it outweighs other factors, including the 
screening procedure implemented by the county attorney's 
office and the manifest distinctions between private and public 
law firms. 
'i[30 The State counters with a more recent Minnesota Court of 
Appeals case, In re Jacobs, 791 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
In Jacobs, as in Beckman, Jacobs argued that "the assigned judge's 
impartiality can reasonably be questioned based on his spouse's 
employment with the [prosecuting] County Attorney's Office." 
Id. at 301. And like Van Huizen in this case, Jacobs based his 
claim on rule 2.11 of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, 
which is functionally identical to our own rule 2.11. Compare 
Utah Code of Jud. Conduct R. 2.ll(A)(2), with Minnesota Code of 
Jud. Conduct R. 2.1 l(A)(2). 
'i[31 The appellate court rejected Jacobs' argument, concluding 
that "Jacobs has not shown that the judge's impartiality can 
reasonably be questioned." Id. at 302. "Assuming that a judge's 
spouse is not personally involved in a case, the personal interest, 
if any, of the judge's spouse in the prosecution of that case to 
conviction would be de minimis" and would not call for 
disqualification. Id. at 302. That reasoning was based, in part, on 
the fact that the "[Hennepin] County Attorney's Office is a large 
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office that prosecutes a large volume of cases." 8 Id. The court also 
noted "that prosecutors are not merely advocates but also 
'ministers of justice' charged with protecting the rights of the 
accused as well as the rights of the public." Id. (citation omitted). 
Finally, as the State notes, the Jacobs court specifically analyzed 
Beckman and determined that the "trend of the case law has been 
against the holding in Beckman." Id. Specifically, the court's 
analysis of other holdings led it to conclude the "closeness of the 
marital relationship, relied on in Beckman, is counter-balanced by 
the institutional aspects of employment in a public law firm such 
as a county attorney's office.'' Id. 
ci[32 We agree with the Minnesota Court of Appeals that 
Beckman is a relative outlier in the caselaw governing when a 
judge must disqualify based on a spousal relationship with an 
attorney in the relevant prosecuting office. For example, in State 
v. Harrell the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a judge's 
recusal from a case was not required simply because his wife 
was an assistant district attorney in same county. 546 N.W.2d 
115, 118 (Wis. 1996). Likewise, in Sensley v. Albritton the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected an 
argument that a judge should have recused himself because his 
"spouse was an Assistant District Attorney in the office of [the] 
District Attorney ... , whose office also represented the 
Defendants" in the case. 385 F.3d 591,598 (5th Cir. 2004). 
<][33 Although we agree that Beckman sets a relatively strict 
standard for disqualification compared to other cases dealing 
with similar facts, we note that none of the cases taking a more 
lenient approach, nor Beckman itself, involved an attorney spouse 
with supervisory authority within the government office in 
question. Indeed, the arguments for disqualification rejected by 
appellate courts have generally been based on the assertion that 
8. Hennepin County includes within its boundaries the city of 
Minneapolis. 
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government agencies are akin to private firms for purposes of 
judicial disqualification; the arguments have not focused on the 
particular responsibilities of the spouse-such as a managerial 
role-that raise more specific concerns.9 For these reasons, we 
find the approach taken in Beckman to be of limited use in our 
resolution of this case. 
ci[34 However, the State's reliance on the facts and reasoning 
of In re Jacobs is likewise misplaced because the prosecutor 
spouse in Jacobs was not a supervisor within the county 
prosecutor's office like the Chief Criminal Deputy was in this 
case. In addition, the Jacobs court relied on the size of the district 
attorney's office as an insulating factor that diminishes a judge 
spouse's appearance of partiality, a factor that holds far less 
sway here. In Jacobs, the court noted that the Hennepin County 
Atton1ey' s Office was "a large office that prosecutes a large 
volume of cases," 791 N.W.2d at 302, whereas here we are 
9. We find no reason to disagree with the majority of decisions 
that have determined that, due to the differences in both 
institutional and economic incentives, a group of government 
attorneys is not necessarily similar to a group of private 
attorneys for the purposes of the judicial disqualification of a 
spouse. See Smith v. Beckman, 683 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Colo. App. 
1984) (holding that, unlike a public attorney, "[a] partner in a 
law firm is said to be 'engaged' in every case in which a member 
of his firm represents a party, primarily because he has a 
financial interest in the outcome of the case"); In re Jacobs, 791 
N.W.2d 300, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (noting the institutional 
difference between prosecutorial offices and private firms); 
accord Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 258 n.8 
(Utah 1992) (citing favorably Beckman, 683 P.2d at 1216, for the 
proposition that public attorneys typically do not benefit from a 
judge's decision in the way that some private attorneys do). 
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addressing the substantially smaller Weber County Attorney's 
Office.10 
135 Thus, while we are not inclined to follow the Colorado 
decision in Smith v. Beckman, as Van Huizen urges, we are not 
persuaded by the State that the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
approach from In re Jacobs is fully applicable here, either. 
2. The Pertinent Facts 
136 Having discovered no precedent to guide our resolution 
of these particular circumstances-where a judge is married to 
an attorney with a supervisory role within the office prosecuting 
the case-we consider the specific circumstances at issue here. 
137 It is uncontested that the Juvenile Judge did not disclose 
her relationship to the Chief Criminal Deputy in the Weber 
County Attorney's Office during the juvenile phase of the case 
and Van Huizen learned of the relationship only after he was 
bound over as an adult. 11 As a consequence, no knowing and 
10. "As the largest public law office in Minnesota, with more 
than 400 employees, [the Hennepin County Attorney's Office] 
handle[s] tens of thousands of adult felony, juvenile and civil 
cases each year." 2015 Highlights, Hennepin County Attorney, 
http://www.hennepinattorney.org/highlights2015 [https://perma. 
cc/NV6H-6EEE]. See also QuickFacts, Hennepin County, 
Minnesota, United States Census Bureau, http://www.census. 
gov/ quickfacts/table/PST045215/27053,49057 [https://perma.cc/ 
8VVM-E3CK] (comparing the July 1, 2015 populations of 
Hennepin County (1,223,149) and Weber County (243,645)). 
11. We acknowledge that the Juvenile Judge may have assumed 
that the litigants, or more probably their lawyers, were generally 
aware that her husband was the Chief Criminal Deputy and that 
the lawyers would raise a concern if one were warranted. We 
(continued ... ) 
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voluntary waiver of any perceived partiality could have 
occurred here, nor did Van Huizen have the facts necessary to 
move to disqualify the Juvenile Judge.12 Further, the record 
shows that the Chief Criminal Deputy had at least some 
involvement in Van Huizen's case once he was bound over to 
the district court. For instance, the Chief Criminal Deputy 
himself responded on behalf of the Weber County Attorney to 
communications from Van Huizen' s current counsel when 
counsel substituted into the case. In addition, the district court's 
docket shows that the Chief Criminal Deputy requested digital 
copies of several proceedings, on behalf of either himself or a 
colleague, on the same day that his spouse signed the bindover 
order. 
<j[38 The record does not reveal the specific nature of the 
relationship between the Chief Criminal Deputy and the deputy 
county attorney who actually handled Van Huizen' s case. The 
only information contained in the record on that point comes 
( ... continued) 
agree with the Vermont Supreme Court, however, that "[i]t is 
not appropriate to make such an assumption." Velardo v. Ovitt, 
2007 VT 69, 129 n.3, 933 A.2d 227 (addressing a situation where 
"the assistant judge [may have] thought that the litigants or their 
lawyers were generally aware of the sibling relationship" 
between the judge and a guardian ad litem). This is particularly 
the c·ase given that it is the party's decision, in consultation with 
counsel, whether to waive a potential conflict, not the attorney's. 
See Utah Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.ll(C) (allowing waiver only if 
the "parties and lawyers agree" to waive, and incorporate the 
agreement into the record). 
12. In a sworn declaration, Van Huizen stated that, "If I had 
known" that the Juvenile Judge "[was] married to the Chief 
Deputy of the Criminal Division," "I would have requested a 
different judge who had no ties to the office prosecuting me." 
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from a brief filed in district court after the bindover in question. 
In that filing, the State represented that the Chief Criminal 
Deputy "does not supervise the attorneys in juvenile court; he 
does not screen cases in juvenile court and is not involved in 
juvenile court matters, those responsibilities are under the 
purview of other attorneys." 
<J[39 We accept that characterization of the Chief Criminal 
Deputy's role in the juvenile court proceeding. And while we 
accept the State's general characterization of the workflow in the 
Weber County Attorney's Office, we also note that on appeal the 
State does not contest Van Huizen' s basic premise, namely that 
his juvenile bindover hearing was criminal in nature. See Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78A-6-702(1) (providing that actions against minors 
accused of crimes like the one at issue here "shall be [filed] by 
criminal information"). That premise suggests that the attorney 
handling the matter in juvenile court interacted with the Chief 
Criminal Deputy's at some level, even if the chain of command 
had an additional supervisory layer while the case was in 
juvenile court. 
<][40 The record before us seems to confirm that inference. For 
example, a single county prosecutor represented the State 
throughout this case, first in the juvenile court and then in the 
district court after bindover. Particularly given that the Chief 
Criminal Deputy had at least some involvement with the case 
once it reached district court and there is no evidence in the 
record of a screening procedure, it seems unlikely that the Chief 
Criminal Deputy was completely walled off from the juvenile 
court proceedings in Van Huizen's case. Similarly, we cannot 
conclude that there was a separation of any substance between 
the juvenile and the adult proceedings-Van Huizen's entire 
case appears to have occurred within the same organizational 
line at the county attorney's office. Indeed, the case attorney and 
the Chief Criminal Deputy apparently worked together on the 
case once it arrived in district court. Therefore, because he was 
head of the criminal division of the Weber County Attorney's 
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Office and the same attorney represented the State throughout 
Van Huizen' s prosecution in juvenile and district court, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the Chief Criminal Deputy was in 
the chain of command over the attorney handling the juvenile 
side of the case, even if he did not supervise the juvenile portion 
directly. 
<_I[41 In any event, the overall goal of the county attorney's 
office was to move Van Huizen from juvenile court to district 
court by means of the bindover proceeding-from a forum 
where the Chief Criminal Deputy may have had some 
attenuated role to one where it is clear the Chief Criminal 
Deputy exercised supervisory authority. With this backdrop in 
mind, we now consider the nature of various positions within 
the county attorney command hierarchy as they relate to the 
question before us. 
3. Implications of the County Attorney's Chain of Command 
<][42 We begin our analysis at one end of the chain of 
command, with the proposition that the Juvenile Judge would 
have been obligated to recuse had the Chief Criminal Deputy 
actually appeared in or worked on Van Huizen's juvenile case 
directly-that is, if he had been a counsel of record. Under rule 
2.11(A)(2)(b), disqualification is required in any situation where 
the judge's spouse is "acting as a lawyer in the proceeding." 
<j[43 Similarly, at the other end of the chain of command, there 
is little question that the Juvenile Judge would have been 
obligated to recuse if her spouse was the Weber County 
Attorney himself-the Chief Criminal Deputy's boss-for at 
least three reasons. First, a county attorney appears to be within 
the class of officers of a party explicitly covered by the Code of 
Judicial Conduct. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 17-18a-301(1) 
(LexisNexis 2013) (stating that "[t]he county attorney is an 
elected officer"), with Utah Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A)(2)(a) 
(requiring a judge to recuse when her spouse is "an officer ... of 
a party"). 
20140602-CA 20 2017 UT App 30 
• 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Van Huizen 
<J[44 Second, a county attorney seems to be among the class of 
persons who have "more than a de minimis interest that could 
be substantially affected by the proceeding." Utah Code Jud. 
Conduct R. 2.1 l(A)(2)( c}.13 This is because, as the elected official 
in charge of prosecutions for the county, the county attorney is 
ultimately responsible for individual case outcomes. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-53-106(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2013) (making "the 
management of deputies and other employees" one of the 
professional duties of a county attorney). Further, we note that a 
county attorney's office is tied directly to the ballot box, and 
although individual votes may be subject to a wide variety of 
influences, a candidate's perceived performance in office is 
certainly among the factors that are likely to inform electoral 
choice. And while we recognize that voters do not often choose 
to either support or disavow a given candidate based on the 
outcome of individual cases such as this, case outcomes as a 
whole certainly can affect voter choice. Thus, although not at the 
same level as a member of a private law firm with a direct 
economic interest in case outcomes, the county attorney's interest 
in the results of his staff's work is not simply de minim.is. 
<J[45 Third, the county attorney typically makes an appearance 
in every case brought by his or her office. Compare Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-18a-202(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2013) (making the county 
attorney a "public prosecutor for the county"), with id. § 17-lSa-
401(1) (mandating that a public prosecutor "shall ... conduct, on 
behalf of the state, all prosecutions for a public offense 
committed within a county"). The county attorney is therefore 
typically counsel of record in every criminal case because it is on 
his behalf that his attorney-staff charges defendants and 
prosecutes cases. See New York Adv. Comm. on Jud. Ethics Op. 
13. '"De minimis,' in the context of interests pertaining to 
disqualification of a judge, means an insignificant interest that 
could not raise a reasonable question regarding the judge's 
impartiality." Utah Code Jud. Conduct, Terminology. 
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07-216 (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/ 
opinions/07-216 .htm [h ttp://perma.cc/WFSS-GSFM] ( determining 
that a judge whose sibling was the district attorney "must 
disqualify him/herself" because "the District Attorney ... is 
involved either directly or indirectly in all criminal cases 
prosecuted in the county where the judge presides"). As a 
consequence, the Juvenile Judge would have been obligated to 
recuse had she been married to the county attorney for the same 
reason that she would have been required to recuse if she were 
married to the case attorney-they are both "acting as a lawyer 
in the proceeding." Utah Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A}(2)(b). 
<J[46 Thus, the Juvenile Judge would have been obligated to 
recuse herself if her husband had been on either end of the chain 
of command-trial counsel or county attorney. But in this case, 
the Chief Criminal Deputy was somewhere in the space 
between, where the determination is less clear. Here, we turn 
again to the basic purpose of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
which is meant to be read broadly to protect "[t]he purity and 
integrity of the judicial process ... against any taint of suspicion 
to the end that the public and litigants may have the highest 
confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts." Haslam v. 
Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1948). The Chief Criminal 
Deputy, by the nature of his position, is responsible to the 
County Attorney for the performance of the attorneys below him 
in the supervisory line. And given that the Juvenile Judge would 
have been required to recuse if she had been married to either 
the Chief Criminal Deputy's subordinate or the Chief Criminal 
Deputy's superior, we believe that, in a public law office, the 
command hierarchy itself is material to the appearance of 
partiality. Thus, because we have determined that the Chief 
Criminal Deputy was within the chain of command for this case, 
we conclude that his marriage to the Juvenile Judge created an 
appearance of partiality. 
20140602-CA 22 2017 UT App 30 
• 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Si:ate v. Van Huizen 
1{47 While we are aware of no reported cases that are directly 
on point, several state ethics opinions have relied on a similar 
analysis. 
There can be no debate over the inappropriateness 
of a judge hearing cases involving the office of a 
District Attorney when the elected District Attorney 
is a close relative of the judge .... Likewise, a 
disinterested person would reasonably conclude 
that the professional relationship between a District 
Attorney and his or her Chief Assistant is such that 
the same standard applies when the judge is a close 
relative of the District Attorney's Chief Assistant or 
another District Attorney with a supervisory role. 
Georgia Jud. Ethics Op. No. 238, 2013 WL 9638986, at *3 (May 1, 
2013); see also, e.g., New York Jud. Adv. Op. 10-05, 2010 WL 
8149118, at *1 (Mar. 2, 2010) (explaining that "the Committee 
previously has advised that a judge must disqualify him/herself 
when the judge's spouse holds a supervisory position in a public 
law office"). Indeed, there is support for the proposition that a 
chief criminal deputy may present a greater concern than the 
county attorney himself, because the chief criminal deputy is 
more directly responsible for prosecutorial functions. The New 
York Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics explained that, 
in this instance, the LJudge's] spouse is in a position 
just below the attorney-in-chief, to whom he/she 
reports, and it is the spouse who bears the 
responsibility of overseeing all criminal practice 
operations including the very operations involved 
herein: State criminal trial proceedings. Thus the 
judge1 s spouse is more closely connected to the 
matters before the judge than the attorney-in-chief. 
New York Adv. Comm. on Jud. Ethics Op. 05-87 (Dec. 8, 2005), 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/05-87.htm 
[http://perma.cc/PL27-TSZ2]. 
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<jf 48 For these reasons, we conclude that, because he was in the 
direct chain of command between County Attorney and the 
attorney prosecuting this case, the Chief Criminal Deputy falls 
within the class of persons who can create an appearance of 
partiality that requires a judge spouse to, at a minimum, obtain 
informed consent from the parties to preside as provided by rule 
2.ll(C). In keeping with the majority of jurisdictions, our 
holding does not extend to a judge's relationship with attorneys 
who merely work in the same public office as the attorney 
appearing before the judge.14 Likewise, our holding does not 
exclude the possibility that thoughtful screening procedures in a 
public office could sufficiently protect a judge married to a 
14. Our conclusion that there was an appearance of partiality 
here might be different if, for instance, the Juvenile Judge's 
spouse was the supervisor of the civil division of the Weber 
County Attorney's Office rather than the criminal division. In 
that situation, where the prosecuting attorney was part of a 
different command hierarchy than the attorney spouse, the 
separation between the divisions would likely be a significant 
distinction from the circumstances here with regard to questions 
concerning a judge's disqualification. Cf Utah Jud. Ethics 
Informal Op. No. 94-6, 1995 WL 17935846, at~ (advising that a 
judge's marriage to an assistant attorney general did not 
automatically require recusal from cases involving a different 
assistant attorney general "due to the ... the divisional 
organization" of the office, among other reasons like the office's 
size and geographic dispersion). But see Utah Jud. Ethics 
Informal Op. No. 88-3, 1988 WL 1582480, at *3 (advising that a 
judge's marriage to a public defender working at the Legal 
Defender Association required recusal "in all cases where LDA 
is the attorney of record," regardless of whether the judge's 
spouse worked on the individual case, in part because of the 
relatively small size of the office which "functions like a private 
law office in that case information and strategies are shared 
among attorneys"). 
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prosecutor from the appearance of partiality, but there is no 
indication that any were in place here. In any event, as we have 
discussed, it is important to err on the side of disclosure when 
considering relationships that could give rise to the reasonable 
appearance of partiality, and no such disclosure occurred on the 
record in this case. 
B. Prejudice Requirement 
149 We have concluded that the Juvenile Judge's marriage to 
the Chief Criminal Deputy created an appearance of partiality. 
But under the unusual circumstances of this case, which reaches 
us late in the proceedings after a successful Manning motion, 
Van Huizen has already been bound over for trial in the district 
court by the Juvenile Judge and convicted as an adult. We 
therefore must determine if any remedy is available to Van 
Huizen based on the Juvenile Judge's appearance of partiality. 
c_i[SO Van Huizen argues that "the appearance of impropriety" 
in his case "requires reversal of the bindover order." The State 
counters that, even if the Juvenile Judge should have recused 
based on her marital relationship with the prosecutor's office, 
Van Huizen "has not shown prejudice, as he must." 15 The key 
15. The State asserts that we must conduct a plain error review 
on this issue. However, plain error is an exception to the 
preservation rule, which generally requires that claims be raised 
in the lower court before being raised on appeal. See State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 'Il 11, 10 P.3d 346 (recognizing "plain error" 
as an exception to the preservation rule). It is true that the 
Juvenile Judge's appearance of partiality was not raised in the 
juvenile court. However, it is also true that the preservation rule 
assumes that the appealing party had the opportunity to object 
in the first instance. Here, the record indicates that Van Huizen 
did not have such an opportunity because he did not have 
knowledge of the relevant facts at the time of the bindover 
(continued ... ) 
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difference behiveen the two positions-and thus the key to 
whether Van Huizen is entitled to relief-turns on the question 
of whether a showing of prejudice is necessary for the remedy 
sought in this case. 
151 Utah law is unsettled on the question· of whether an 
appellant must show prejudice when a judge's relationship 
constituted an appearance of partiality, with two apparently 
diverging approaches. One line of cases imposes a prejudice 
requirement on appeal. For instance, our supreme court has held 
that "[f]ailure to observe [the recusal standard in the Code of 
Judicial Conduct] may subject the judge to disciplinary 
measures. However, that does not necessarily mean that the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial." State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 
1091, 1094 (Utah 1988). Building on that decision, the court 
concluded in State v. Gardner that a judge's failure to recuse, even 
( ... continued) 
decision. Thus, we conclude that plain error i~ not the proper 
framework for our review. See In re D.B., 2012 UT 65, <][ 34, 289 
P.3d 459 (noting parenthetically that the preservation rule "does 
not apply where the question did not exist or could not be raised 
below" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Furthermore, the State's argument implies that a defendant has a 
duty to investigate and preserve appearance of partiality issues 
in the first instance: Certainly, a defendant must timely raise any 
questions of this sort that he is aware of from whatever source. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(l)(B)(iii) (requiring a disqualification 
motion to be filed not later than twenty-one days after "the date 
on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon 
which the motion is based"). But, as we have discussed, it is the 
judge's duty to disclose facts relevant to disqualification in the 
first instance. In any event, the State's larger point-that some 
Utah law supports the proposition that Van Huizen must show 
prejudice-is nonetheless accurate, and we address that below. 
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in circumstances where he should have done so, was subject to 
harmless error analysis. 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989). Later, in 
State v. Alonzo, the supreme court reiterated that a judge's 
"failure to recuse himself or herself does not automatically 
e~title a defendant to a new trial." 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998). 
Relying on Gardner for the proposition that "the appearance of 
bias may be grounds for reversal if actual prejudice is shown," 
the Alonzo court concluded that "[a]ctual prejudice can be shown 
when there exists a reasonable likelihood that the result would 
have been more favorable for the defendants absent the trial 
judge's appearance of bias." Id. (citing Gardner, 789 P.2d at 278). 
cil52 Another case, however, indicates that a prejudice showing 
is not always required. In Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 
the supreme court addressed an appearance of impropriety 
involving a member of this court. 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992). On 
certiorari, the Reichert court addressed a situation where one of 
the judges on a panel deciding the case was related through 
marriage to two partners at the firm that argued it. Id. at 254. As 
with the proceedings at the juvenile level in this case, the Reichert 
record contained no suggestion that the related attorneys 
"participated in [the] case at any time." Id. at 255. Also like this 
case, the petitioner did not "contend[] that [the judge's] failure to 
disqualify herself was intentional or malicious." Id. at 255. 
Instead, the petitioner simply argued that the "[judge's] 
participation create[d] an appearance of impropriety." Id. The 
supreme court agreed and, without conducting a prejudice 
analysis, "vacate[ d] the court of appeals' decision and 
remand[ed] to the court of appeals for rehearing of the 
substantive issues.11 Id. 
153 We believe that the apparent conflict between these 
precedents can be reconciled because there are several obvious 
differences between this case and the cases that required a 
showing of prejudice. First, the procedural posture is different. 
Unlike this case, the cases that required showing prejudice 
involved situations where the facts constituting the judge's 
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alleged appearance of bias where known and brought to the 
lower court's attention. E.g., Gardner, 789 P .2d at 278 
("Defendant filed an affidavit of bias and prejudice against the 
trial judge because he worked in the [ court building where the 
crime took place]."); Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1093 ("Defendants filed a 
pretrial motion to disqualify [the judge] from presiding at their 
hfal."); State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(" After these alleged comments were made, defense counsel 
filed a motion for the trial judge to recuse himself and submitted 
affidavits detailing their versions of the trial judge's 
comments."), aff'd, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998). Thus, in instances 
where the supreme court has required a showing of prejudice to 
grant a new trial, the complaining party had already tried-but 
failed-to disqualify the trial judge using appropriate 
procedural mechanisms, such as Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29.16 
Cj{54 The supreme court acknowledged the importance of that 
point in Neeley when it stated, "absent a showing of actual bias 
or an abuse of discretion, failure to [disqualify] does not 
constitute reversible error as long as the requirements of [rule 
16. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) outlines the process 
by which a party may move to disqualify a judge based on "bias 
or prejudice, or conflict of interest." The judge against whom the 
motion is directed must either grant the motion or certify it to a 
reviewing judge for decision. Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(2). "If the 
reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely 
filed, filed in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing 
judge shall assign another judge to the action .... " Id. 
R. 29(c)(3)(A). Rule 29 applies in juvenile court. Utah R. Juv. P. 
57(e) (incorporating a party's rights under rule 29 of the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure into the rules of juvenile procedure). 
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29] are met." 748 P.2d at 1094-95.17 See also State 1.J. Onti'oeros, 835 
P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1992} ("Because the trial judge 
precisely followed the provisions of Rule 29, [the appellant] 
must show actual bias or an abuse of discretion in order to 
prevail on this point."). And in Alonzo, the supreme court 
explained that point further. "The trial judge in this case 
complied exactly with rule 29. After he had been approved to 
continue [with the case], the burden shifted to the petitioners to 
show actual bias or abuse of discretion." Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 979 
(citing Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094-95, and affirming this court's 
decision on that point). 
155 Based on Alonzo and Neeley, it appears that a failed 
attempt to disqualify a trial judge may be a prerequisite to 
requiring a showing of prejudice on appeal. As we understand 
it, this burden shifting rationale makes sense. In the first 
instance, it is the judge's duty to either recuse sua sponte or 
disclose the facts that might give rise to an appearance of 
partiality. Once the facts have been disclosed, the defendant may 
either waive the appearance of partiality or move to disqualify 
the judge under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which 
imposes a timeliness requirement on the movant.18 Assuming 
17. In Neeley, the procedural mechanism in play was codified at 
Utah Code section 77-35-29. However, as this court noted in State 
v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), rule 29 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is section 77-35-29's current 
analogue. 
18. The rule requires the movant to file not later than twenty-one 
days after "the date on which the moving party learns or with 
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the 
grounds upon which the motion is based." Utah R. Crim. P. 
29(c)(l)(B)(iii); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(2) (imposing the 
same timeliness requirement in civil actions). Optimally, the 
(continued ... ) 
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the defendant timely moves to disqualify the judge, the motion 
is either granted or referred to a neutral judge to decide · the 
issue. See supra <JI 53 note 16. Thus, rule 29 is the mechanism by 
which defendants may invoke the relevant requirements of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct. And hence, when reviewing a case in 
which the defendant moved to disqualify the judge, appellate 
courts assume that the issue was resolved properly through the 
rule 29 process in the first instance. The defendant therefore 
bears the extra burden on appeal of showing not just an 
appearance of bias, but actual bias. 
<J[56 However, that process presumes that the judge disclosed 
the facts necessary to support the rule 29 motion in the first place 
or that the party learned those facts through some other means. 
The case at bar, though, involves an appearance of partiality that 
was raised for the first time on appeal because the judge did not 
disclose the facts giving rise to the challenge. Van Huizen 
therefore had no basis to invoke rule 29,19 and the reasoning 
underlying the imposition of a burden of prejudice on appeal 
does not apply here. 
157 The second difference between this case and those 
requiring a showing of prejudice is found in the judge's degree 
of involvement in the ultimate disposition of the case. In State v. 
Alonzo, the supreme court affirmed this court's reasoning that a 
judge's appearance of partiality was more likely to be harmless 
( ... continued) 
time would begin at the point of the judge's disclosure to the 
parties of any relevant relationship. 
19. Van Huizen's averment that he was not aware of the 
relationship until well after the bindover is uncontradicted in the 
record before us, and no one has suggested that his lack of 
knowledge was the result of any failure to "exercise ... 
reasonable diligence." See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(l)(B)(iii). 
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because the "[d]efendants' guilt was determined by a jury and 
the judge's [biased] statements were ... not made in the jury's 
presence." 973 P.2d 975,, 979-80 (Utah 1998) (original ellipses,, 
citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, both this 
court and the supreme court seemed to consider the jury to be an 
important intermediary in the decision making process which 
shields a criminal defendant from the possible effects of a 
judge's partiality. Utah is not alone in taking that position. E.g., 
Commonwealth v. Mercado, 649 A.2d 946, 960 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) 
("Moreover, when a defendant is tried by a jury, which exercised 
sole responsibility for evaluating the testimony and arriving at a 
verdict, the integrity of the fact-finding process is insulated from 
any predispositions held by the trial judge."). But see Parenteau v. 
Jacobson, 586 N.E.2d 15, 19 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that "a 
courtroom has no place for a judge whose impartiality in a 
matter may be reasonably questioned, even if he is not the fact-
finder"). 
<]l58 In this case, Van Huizen never had the opportunity to 
invoke the procedural mechanism that the Alonzo court 
determined shifts the burden and requires the appellant "to 
show actual bias or abuse of discretion" to prevail on appeal. 
Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 979. Additionally, the Juvenile Judge acted 
alone in Van Huizen' s bindover hearing, making both factual 
and legal determinations in arriving at a decision that is both fact 
sensitive and highly discretionary; there was no jury to insulate 
the bindover decision from the appearance of partiality. See id. at 
979-80. 
'1[59 For these reasons, we conclude that this case is dissimilar 
to the Alonzo line of cases that require a prejudice showing. This 
case is similar, however, to Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 
which did not impose a prejudice requirement. In this case, as in 
Reichert, the facts constituting the appearance of partiality were 
not disclosed by the judge below and there was no jury to 
insulate the process from the potential effects emanating from 
the appearance of partiality. 830 P.2d 252, 257-58 (Utah 1992). 
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Thus, we conclude that Van Huizen is entitled to relief without 
showing prejudice on the basis that the Juvenile Judge's 
marriage to the Chief Criminal Deputy created an appearance of 
partiality that went undisclosed and thus unaddressed below. 
CJI60 Other courts have reached a similar conclusion. For 
example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court "decline[d] to 
implement a harmless error test when evaluating violations of 
the code [of judicial ethics] by the members of the New 
Hampshire bench" because "it would be inconsistent with the 
goals of our code to require certain standards of behavior from 
the judiciary in the interest of avoiding the appearance of 
partiality, but then to allow a judge's ruling to stand when those 
standards have been violated." Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 
A.2d 388, 391 (N.H. 1992); see also Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 
745, 751 (D.C. 1989) (en bane) ("Furthermore, a defendant is not 
required to show prejudice from a violation of the standard set 
by [the code of conduct] as would affect the outcome of the trial 
in order to be entitled to the extraordinary writ of mandamus."); 
State v. Smith, 635 So. 2d 512, 514 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (" Although 
in the instant case there was no motion to recuse [ the judge], we 
believe that the interests of justice and the avoidance of 
impropriety require a reversal of sentence and a remand for 
resentencing."). 
<JI:61 And in Velardo v. Ovitt, the Vermont Supreme Court 
addressed circumstances similar to those here. 2007 VT 69, 933 
A.2d 227. In Velardo, a party claimed that the trial judge should 
have recused due to an appearance of partiality that was not 
identified until after trial in a child custody dispute. Id. en 1. After 
determining that the complicated circumstances created the 
appearance of partiality, the court turned to the question of 
remedy and determined that a split of authority exists on 
whether vacatur is warranted absent a showing of prejudice. Id. 
<JI<JI 12, 23-28. The court stated: 
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State v. Van Huizen 
We reject the North Dakota Supreme Court's 
holding that orders of a judge who creates an 
appearance of impropriety cannot be set aside 
unless there is a showing of actual bias or 
prejudice. On this point, we agree with the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court that such a rule would 
be inconsistent with the goals of our code to 
require certain standards of behavior from the 
judiciary in the interest of avoiding the appearance 
of partiality, but then to allow a judge's ruling to 
stand when those standards have been violated. 
On the other hand, we believe that [the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court's] holding that a 
judge's failure to disqualify can never be harmless 
goes too far. 
Id. <JI 28 ( citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The 
Velardo court therefore took a middle ground and imported a 
federal balancing test to determine on a case by case basis 
whether vacatur is a proper remedy. While we do not adopt the 
Vermont balancing test, that approach confirms and reinforces 
the analytical approach that we have identified in our own 
precedent. 
<]162 For instance, as in our case, the Velardo court noted that 
the judge "had actual knowledge of the source of the conflict" 
and "an independent duty to disclose the relationship that 
created the conflict." Id. <fl 29. The court also noted that the 
decision below was a "very difficult ... case," id. <]131 (internal 
quotation marks omitted), a factor similar to the situation here, 
where the Juvenile Judge's decision was apparently a close call-
she found by the high standard of clear and convincing evidence 
that one of the two statutory factors favored Van Huizen's 
retention in juvenile court. Thus, we agree with the Velardo court 
that, because "the result was not easily reached," "[t]he 
appearance of influence, therefore, [was] significant." See id. 
Finally, the court pointed out that, "because we afford such wide 
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discretion to the family court, we cannot determine with any 
precision the influence of partiality, if any." Id. Without 
question, juvenile courts in Utah are similarly afforded "broad 
discretion regarding judgments, based on the juvenile court's 
specialized experience and training," In re J.R., 2011 UT App 180, 
'Il 2, 257 P.3d 1043 (per curiam), which serves to both obscure the 
effects of partiality and potentially amplify the consequences. 
For these reasons, the Vermont Supreme Court's analysis 
supports our own conclusion that a showing of prejudice or 
actual bias on appeal is not required in this case. 
C. Remedy 
'}I63 We conclude that Van Huizen is entitled to a new 
bindover hearing because the Juvenile Judge's spousal 
relationship with the Chief Criminal Deputy created an 
appearance of partiality in the original bindover proceeding. 
Because the Juvenile Judge did not disclose her relationship, Van 
Huizen did not have the opportunity to move for 
disqualification under Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which 
allows a party to challenge the impartiality of a judge in a 
juvenile case. See supra <j[ 53 note 16. Thus, Van Huizen never 
invoked the procedural mechanism that in other cases has been a 
factor in requiring a showing of prejudice to succeed on a claim 
of appearance of judicial partiality on appeal. See State v. Alonzo, 
973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998) (indicating that a failed attempt to 
disqualify a judge is a prerequisite for requiring a party "to show 
actual bias or abuse of discretion" on appeal). Further, the 
bindover decision here was solely within the realm of the 
Juvenile Judge's discretion, with no independent decision maker 
such as a jury to attenuate the potential effects of any partiality. 
See id. at 979-80 (indicating that a jury helps insulate a judge 
from the effects of an appearance of partiality). 
<_[64 We therefore conclude that Van Huizen is not required to 
show prejudice to prevail on appeal under these circumstances. 
In a situation like this, where the relevant information was 
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neither disclosed by the judge nor known to Van Huizen at the 
time of his bindover hearing, the appearance of partiality is 
enough to require a new hearing. See Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. 
Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 254, 257-58 (Utah 1992) (remanding for 
new proceedings without conducting a prejudice analysis in 
circumstances where the facts giving rise to an appearance of 
partiality were not previously known). 
CONCLUSION 
<JI 65 Based on the analysis set forth above, we vacate the 
juvenile court's bindover order and remand the issue for a new 
hearing before a different judge. If Van Huizen is bound over to 
district court, the results of his district court proceeding will 
remain undisturbed. If Van Huizen is not bound over, his 
convictions in the district court shall be vacated. 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER ON BIND OVER 
vs. 
COOPER VAN HUIZEN, 
Defendant. 
Case Number: 1003447 
Judge: Michelle E Heward 
This matter came before the court for a preliminary hearing/examination and a 
subsequentbest·interest hearing, on December 20, 2013. The State was present and represented 
by Brody E. Flint, Qeputy Weber County Attorney. The Defendant was present and represented 
by his attorney, . Rex Bray; co-defendant Josh Parley Dutson was present and represented by 
counsel, Mary Ann Ellis. The Court heard evidence from all parties and being fully apprised, 
now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The State met its burden and the court finds probable cause to believe that the 
~es listed in the Information, two aggravated robberies and one aggravated burglary, occurred 
as alleged. 
2. Further, there is probable cause to believe that Cooper Van Huizen committed the 
offenses alleged in the Information. 
3. The Defendant has no prior record in the juvenile court. 
FILED 
JAN 2120;~ 
... JUVE NI Lf; COURi 
~F.CONO JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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4. These offenses were committed with other co-defendants. The Court therefore 
considers the Defendant's degree of culpability in comparison to the other co-defendants, and 
finds that his culpability was significant. 
a. Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was less at the scene of the crime than 
others. There is insufficient evidence that he brandished a gun or switchblade knife 
during the commission of the burglary or robberies although he was present and assisted 
in the forced entrance into the home with co.defendants. 
b. Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was to plan and facilitate the robberies. 
Specifically the guns used were guns from Mr. Van Huizen's home. Mr. Van Huizen 
provided the guns knowing they would be used in the burglary and robberies. 
c. Mr. Van Huizen's assistance in the robbery ensured that the other co-
defendants would have guns to use when breaking into the home and robbing the persons 
therein. 
5. Mr. Van Huizen' s role in the offense was committed in a violent, aggressive, or 
premeditated manner. 
a. These offenses were committed with guns and threats of violence. The 
guns. belonged to Mr. Van Huizen and were provided knowing they would be used in the 
burglary and robberies. This planning occurred over a period of time and was not ~ spur 
of the moment decision. 
b. Mr. Van Huizen was with co-defendants who forced their way at gun 
point into one of the most protected and sacred areas in our society, the home. 
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c. The violence committed in the home was facilitated by Mr. Van Huizen's 
planning and preparation. Mr. Van Huizen lmew that the guns were intended to be used 
in a burglary and robbery for drugs. 
d. Mr. Van Huizen' s presence in the home, by itself, was a threat to the 
victims and a danger to others who were in or could have come into the home. 
6. This is Mr. Van Huizen's first offense injuvenile court. 
7. Public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the district court. 
a. Mr. Van Huizen is 16 years old and juvenile court jurisdiction is limited 
until the age of21; the district court's jurisdiction is not limited. 
b. The involvement of drugs, violence, firearms, and forcing entry into a 
home to commit robberies places these offenses among the most serious in our 
community. 
c. The likelihood of harm to others was great given the facts of this case. 
People understandably react violently to such acts of aggression, particularly when they 
occur in the home. Acts of this nature are extremely volatile and can easily lead to even 
fatal harm to law enforcement and other members of the public. 
d. Public safety requires a strong response and longer correctional period 
than is available in the.juvenile court. 
e. The defense provided evidence of a loving family and good home. The 
court finds that will help the Defendant in terms of his long tenn rehabilitation, but it also 
works against him in this case. Despite the benefits of that home he chose to engage in 
violent and inesponsible acts that put the safety of members of the public at grave risk. 
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8. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it would be contrary to the 
best interest of the Defendant to bind him over to the jurisdiction of the district court. 
9. The defense has not shown, however, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is 
in the best interest of the public for this case to be adjudicated injuvenile court The court finds 
that it is contrary to the best interests of the public to allow the case to remain in juvenile court. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER 
The Defendant should be and hereby is bound over to the district court for further 
proceedings on the Information. An arrest warrant has issued and bail has been set. 
DATED thisL day of January, 2014. 
BY THE COURT: 
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- 132-
interest of the public to bind the defendants over to the 
jurisdiction of the district court . 
The Court wants to make sure that I ' m making a record 
that is clear for both of the defendants individually and not 
placing them together. Counsel, I ' ll ask if there are any 
6 questions with regard to the findings as I go through here that 
7 you ask questions if I'm not clear with regard to each of your 
8 clients and to the State ' s interest so that I can make sure that 
9 that record is clear, and I ' ll attempt to do that. 
10 . The Court has considered the five statutory factors that 
11 are set forth in 78A- 6- 702(3) (c). The first of those factors by 
12 stipulation has been found to go in favor of each of the 
13 defendants . Neither one of them have prior records here in the 
14 juvenile court that are of any signifi cance here . 
15 The second factor is whether the offenses were committed 
16 with one or more persons -- I'm sor ry, these offenses were 
1 7 committed with one or more persons , so the Court considers 
18 whether each of the minor ' s involvement , whether each of them 
19 had a greater or lesser degree of culpability than their co-
2 0 defendants . 
21 
22 
With regard to Mr. JPD, the Court finds that his role 
in carrying out the offenses was one of planning and pulling 
23 people together . The evidence before the Court shows that the 
24 
25 
culpability of Mr . JPD both before and during the actual offense 
shows that he had culpability . 
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1 He was involved in acquiring guns prior 
2 with the knowledge that they would be used in the robbery. He 
3 was in a place to use those weapons to gain entry. I ' m sorry, 
4 he was in on the plan to use the weapons to gain entry into the 
5 home, and to take what he and his co-defendants wanted from the 
6 people within the home. 
7 While the Court does not find that he pointed a gun at 
8 either of the victims -- I.'m just not sure what happened there - -
9 but I do find that .that was done by two of the -- the two adults 
10 that were involved. Mr. JPD ' s involvement had a high degree of 
11 culpability in insuring that t hat would happen , that the people 
12 that he was with would pull guns and use them after breaking into 
13 the home. 
14 With regard to Mr. CVH, the Court finds that his 
15 involvement was less in terms of his physical involvement at the 
16 scene. I don't have evidence that he brandished a gun, and I 
17 have insufficient evidence to determine whether he had a 
18 switch - - the switchblade that had been referred to by others 
19 that have testified here today . 
20 
21 
His involvement was in planning and facilitating , the 
offenses. His involvement was actually greater than that of 
22 Mr . JPD' s . These were his guns from his home, and this was well 
23 planned out in terms of how the guns would be used. So in terms 
24 
25 
of the second factor, the Court finds that the involvement of 
each of the -- each of these defendants was significant in terms 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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e 1 of the offenses . 
2 Whether the role -- the third factor as the extent of 
3 the rn1nor ' s role in -- was it committed in a violent, aggressive 
• 
4 or premeditated manner . The premeditation in these offenses has 
5 been already been referred to by the Court. This was not a 
6 spur of the moment , a dumb or a childish decision, a quick 
7 reaction. Both defendants were involved in planning the 
• 8 robberies and the burglary. 
9 There were multiple steps t hat were carried out prior to 
10 actually going out to the home. This took place over a period of 
• 11 time, giving both of the defendants ample opportunity to retract 
12 themselves from the offenses , but they chose not t o do so. These 
13 were violent and aggressive offenses with the use of guns and 
• 14 threats, going inside one of the most protected and sacred places 
15 in our society, the home. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
16 The violence that was employed, albeit by others in 
17 terms of pulling the guns, was made possible by Mr. CVH and 
18 facilitated by Mr. JPD. In addition to providing the guns by 
19 Mr. CVH and the planning or pulling together of the parties and 
20 facilitation by Mr . JPD, they both -- both of these defendants 
21 forced their way into a home with the assistance of friends 
22 that they were with who were using guns , and their physical 
23 presence -- I'm talking about the defendant's physical presence 
24 was a threat when the offense took place . The Court finds that 
25 the roles of both JPD and CVH to have been involved involved 
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1 violence, aggression and were premeditated . 
2 The number and nature - - the next factor is the number 
3 and nature of prior adjudications in the juvenile court. The 
4 Court finds that those again go i n favor of the defendants here. 
5 They do not have violent - - or they do not have records of any 
6 significance here in the juvenile court. 
7 The fifth factor is whether public safety is better 
8 served by adjudicating the minors in the juvenile court or in the 
9 district court. The Court believes that public safety would be 
10 better served in both of these cases by adjudicating them in the 
11 district court. 
12 They are older juveniles, 16 and 17-years of age . 
13 The extent of the juvenile court ' s involvement is limited until 
14 the age -- is limited to the age of 21. The district court's 
15 jurisdiction is not limited. While these were first offenses, 
16 the involvement of drugs, violence, particularly the use of 
17 firearms and forcibly entering into a home where people therein 
18 were robbed places the offense amongst the most serious in our 
19 community. The likelihood of further injury and harm is great 
20 when given the facts of this case. Society deserves to be 
21 strongly protected against this activity. 
22 The Court does find that the defense has shown that it 
23 is contrary to the best interest of the minors to bind them over 
24 to the jurisdiction of the district court. There are more 
25 rehabilitative services that are available in the juvenile system 
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1 than in the adult system. Both of the minors , both of the 
2 defendants appear to have loving families and homes that they 
3 have come from . They have had opportunities in the past to 
4 succeed, and they have skill sets that show that they have many 
5 capabilities . They chose not to use those. Either the support 
6 nor the positive skill sets that I think both of them have, they 
7 chose not to use those in· this situation. 
8 So the Court finds that the defense has not met its 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
burden of proving that it is contrary to the best interest of the 
minor and the best interest of the ptiblic to bind the defendants 
over to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Let me make sure 
that I've said that right . While the defense has met the burden 
of proving it is contrary to the minor ' s best interest , neither 
defense has met its burden of showing that it's in the best 
interest of the public in this inter in this instance , and the • 
16 matter is bound over to the district court. 
17 On a personal note, this is not the way that I would 
18 
19 
20 
21 
want any young man to start his majority with serious offenses 
in the adult system. It ' s tough to be held accountable for 
your actions , but I also think that it ' s necessary -- that 
accountability is necessary. You still both have a lot of years 
22 in front of you, and it is the Court ' s hope that you use this 
23 experience to do -- make better decisions and choices in the 
24 
25 
future as you move forward . 
That being said, I need arrest warrants here. Does the 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OMNIBUS RULING AND STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
POST-SENTENCE MOTIONs\UG 2 9 2014 
vs. Case No. 131902Si....,.2 ______ _ 
COOPER JOHN ANTHONY VAN 
HUIZEN. 
Judge Ernie W. JoJJes t=ILED I AUG 2 ~ 2Dt't I 
Defendant. SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's several post-sentence 
motions. In order, Defendant has presented the Court with the following motions: 
1) the "Motion to Correct Sentence Imposed Illegally as a Result of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel"; 2) the "Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious 
Youth Offender Bindover Order"; 3) the ''Motion to Declare Mispleas or Nullify 
Pleas"; 4) the "Motion to Quash Bindover Order from Juvenile Court"; and 5) a 
"Motion for Stay of Sentence Pending Appeal" combined with an "Application for 
Certificate of Probable Cause." Counsel for both the State and Defendant have 
fully briefed these motions and the Court has carefully considered the arguments 
and law cited therein. In the interest of judicial efficiency, and as these motions 
touch on similar themes and legal questions, the Court will address these motions 
in this single omnibus ruling and order. 
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BACKGROUND 
Defendant, following his participation in a violent home invasion, was 
charged with two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated 
burglary. Defendant, a-16-year-old minor, was then bound over from juvenile court 
to this Court to face the charges as an adult. The bind over process was conducted 
in accordance with the Juvenile Court Act, specifically its provisions relating to 
serious youth offenders See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702. In March of this year, 
Defendant entered guilty pleas to two reduced, second-degree felony robbery 
charges. On May 7, 2014, Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent 1- to 15-
year terms in the Utah State Prison. 
Defendant, by raising several alleged deficiencies, now seeks to challenge 
~e p!ocess by which Defendant was bound over into district court from juvenile 
court; entered his plea of guilty, and a sentence was imposed. In deciding these 
motions, the Court will address each motion according to its chronological relation 
t<? Defendant's proceedings, rather than in the order that Defendant filed the 
motion with the Court. Following the Court's analysis and ruling, the Court will 
specify its respective orders. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Motion to Quash Bind Over Order from Juvenile Court 
First, the Court addresses Defendant's motion to quash the bind over order 
from juvenile court. Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by several alleged 
• 
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legal and structural errors that occw-red during the process by which the juvenile 
court bound him over to this Court. The statutory mechanisms establishing this 
bind over process are outlined below. 
The Juvenile Court Act, specifically in its provisions relating to transferring 
serious you~ offenders to district court, provides that juveniles may be bound over 
., · and held to answer to as adults in district court if the criminal information filed 
against those juveniles charges them with certain types of violent offenses. See 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702. This process is not automatic and is subject to the 
state meeting its burden to establish probable cause that that the violent offense has 
been committed and that the juvenile defendant committed said violent offense. 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3). If the state met this burden, the juvenile court 
"shall order that the defendant be bound over [to the district court] ... unless the 
juvenile court judge finds that it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor 
and to the public .... " Id. 
The factors that a juvenile court judge may rely upon in making the 
determination to bind over the defendant are very specific, and the Juvenile Court 
Act provides that a juvenile defendant may appeal a bind over order. See Utah 
Code Ann. 78A-6-702{3)( c ), 78A-6-704(a). On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals 
then reviews the bind over order and the "underlying factual findings made by the 
juvenile judge" for "clear error" in order to determine whether to affirm or reverse 
the bind over order. State ex rel. M.E.P., 114 P.3d 596,598 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). 
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This process illustrates that it is only the appellate court that is vested with 
the authority to consider and potentially quash juvenile bind over orders. 
Defendant has offered sundry argwnents as to why this Court should quash the 
bind over order, but such arguments to this Court are unavailing, as it possesses no 
jurisdiction to issue the particular relief sought Only the appellate court may 
consider these arguments and order the bind over order quashed if that court 
determines that such action is appropriate. For lack of jurisdiction, this Court 
cannot grant such a motion. 
II. Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious Youth Bindover 
Order 
The Court now turns to Defendant's motion to reinstate the timeframe to 
appeal the bind over order. Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the failure 
of then-serving counsel to timely file an appeal of the bind over order and the 
failure of same counsel to inform Defendant of the availability of such an appeal. 
Defendant cites the Utah Supreme Court case State v. Manning in support of the 
proposition that it is appropriate to reinstate appellate time when appeals of right 
are defaulted by counsel and through no fault of the defendant. See State v. 
Manning, 122 P .3d 628, 636 (Utah 2005). • The State agreed in its opposing 
m~morandum that under Manning, Defendant should have his time to appeal the 
bind over order reinstated. ® 
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Manning provides that it is appropriate to reinstate a Defendant's direct 
appeal right.if it can be determined that the defendant "been prevented in some 
meaningful way from proceeding with a first appeal of right." Id. at 63 S. One of 
the outlined circumstances of Manning leading to reinstatement of the direct appeal 
right is that the defendant can demonstrate that ''the court or the defendant's 
attorney failed to properly advise defendant of the right to appeal." Id. While the 
State points out that the juvenile court bind over order clearly specified the 30-day 
right to appeal that order, Defendant maintains that his counsel neither informed 
the Defendant of this fact nor provided the Defendant with a copy of the bind over 
order. 
Normally a gUilty plea, such as Defendant's here, would serve as a waiver of 
any alleged procedural defects with the bind over. See State v. Rhinehart, 167 P .3d 
1046, 1049 (Utah 2007). However, our Supreme Court has specified that this 
~ waiver does apply to alleged errors of a jurisdictional nature. Id. Here, had 
Defendant timely appealed the bind over order, he would have been challenging 
the decision of the juvenile court to confer jwisdiction over the Defendant to this 
Court. This question, combined with the fact that Defendant has offered evidence 
supporting the application of the Manning circumstances (namely that counsel 
failed to advise Defendant of his right to· appeal and failed to provide him with the 
juvenile court order specifying the available reliet) leads the Court to conclude that 
reinstating Defendant's time to appeal the bind over order is appropriate. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
0rrmiuti£ Lulir,g 2.ua 0tcwr o:·. Defenciant's r·ost-Scmence l✓.wtions 
Civil No. 131902542 
Page 6 of 13 
The Court, however, must stress that granting Defendant's motion here does 
not affect Defendant's present incarceration, as the Court's decision cannot unwind 
all proceedings post-bind over order. When this Court heard the case, accepted the 
plea, and announced a sentence, it did so with the understanding that it held proper 
jurisdiction via bind over order. Barring an appellate court decision as to the 
validity of that bind over order and its effect on this Court's sentence, the Court 
lacks the authority to stay the sentence in conjunction with reinstating the time to 
appeal the bind over order. The appropriate procedural mechanism to stay a 
sentence pending appeal is found in Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. As mentioned in the outset of this ruling, Defendant has made a motion 
invoking that rule, and the Court will address the merits of that motion later in this 
ruling. 
m. Motion to Declare Mispleas or Nullify Pleas 
Next the Court addresses Defendant's motion that this Court recognize 
Defendant's guilty pleas as mispleas or alternatively to nullify those guilty pleas. 
Defendant asserts that this Court retains the authority to declare a misplea here or 
to nullify his pleas because the guilty pleas were not knowing or voluntary~ While 
it is true that a trial court may withdraw a plea of guilty upon a showing that the 
plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made, such motions must be made prior to 
the announcement of sentence. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(a)-(b). Any 
• 
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challenge to a guilty plea "not made within the [ specified] time period" can only be 
pursued via request for post-conviction relief. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)( c ). 
Here, the Court has announced its sentence regarding the Defendant's 
conviction. Accordingly, the Court possesses neither the authority to hear such a 
motion nor the ability to grant the requested remedy. Defendant's arguments 
regarding knowledge, volition, and their relation to his guilty pleas may only be 
offered in a separate, civil petition for post-conviction relief. The Court therefore 
cannot grant this motion. 
IV. Motion to Correct Sentence Imposed Illegally as a Result oflneffe.ctive 
Assistance of Counsel 
Defendant also moves this Court, pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22( e ), to correct Defendant's sentence on the basis that the sentence was 
illegal. In support of this motion, Defendant offers that the sentence was illegal 
due to trial counsel's ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, 
Defendant argues that the assistance was ineffective because trial counsel failed at 
the sentencing hearing to distinguish Defendant's culpability from that of his co-
defendants', and failed to provide the Court (for purposes of presentence reporting) 
with information that Defendant alleges was essential to consider. -Despite 
Defendant's strenuous argument, ineffective assistance of counsel does not serve 
as grounds for declaring a sentence illegal. 
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Regarding illegal sentences, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the 
definition promulgated by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. State v. Yazzie, 203 
P.3d 984, 988 (Utah 2009). Under that definition, a sentence is illegal if it "is 
ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is 
internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is 
uncertain ~ to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment 
of conviction did not authorize." United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 
(10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the State points out, a 
sentence is also illegal if the imposing court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. State 
v. Thorkelson, 84 P.3d 854,857 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
As the Court cannot consider Defendant's arguments of ineffective 
assistance of counsel as a proper basis for declaring the sentence here illegal, it 
must determine whether the any of the aforementioned, recognized grounds apply. 
The Court determines that they do not. Defendant pied guilty to two ~ounts of 
robbery. Robbery is classified under Utah Code Annotated §76-6-301 as a second .. 
degree felony. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203, the appropriate 
sentence that may be levied against a person convicted of a second degree felony is 
an indeterminate term of imprisonment "not less than one year nor more than 15 
years." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203(2). Defendant's sentence here was not 
ambiguous with resp~ct to time or manner. It was not internally contradictory. It 
did not omit a required term imposed by statute. It was not uncertain as to the 
• 
• 
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substance of the sentence. It was precisely the sort of sentence authorized by the 
conviction of a second-degree felony. As previously established, the Court had 
jurisdiction subsequent to the issuance of the bind over order from juvenile court. 
None of the established grounds that would render-a sentence illegal and require 
correction under Rule 22( e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure exist here. 
Accordingly, the Court can find no basis to properly grant Defendant's motion. 
V. Motion to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal and Issue a Certificate of 
Probable Cause 
Finally, the Court addresses Defendant's petition for a certificate of probable 
cause motion to his Motion to stay his sentence pending appeal. In order to release 
a currently incarcerated defendant during the pendency of his appeal, Rule 27 of 
i> the Utah Rule of Criminal· Procedure requires that that this Court first issue a 
certificate of probable cause and determine by clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant is not likely to flee and does not pose a danger to the community. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 27(b)(l). In order to properly issue a certificate of probable 
cause, the Court must find that the Defendant's appeal is not taken for the purpose 
of delay and raises substantial issues of law or fact reasonably likely to result in 
reversal. Id. at (b )(3). 
Out of the myriad arguments Defendant has made, the Court has recognized 
only one as cogniz.ant: that the Defendant may appeal the juvenile Court bind over 
order due to the failure of trial counsel to apprise him of his right to appeal the 
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order. However, this Court is not convinced by Defendant's arguments that it is 
reasonably likely that the Court of Appeals will quash the bind over order. 
Furthermore, on the basis of the clearly delineated jurisprudence that informs the 
Court's analysis of Defendant's other motions, the Court is not convinced that 
Defendant~ raised any substantial issues of law and fact that make it reasonably 
likely that the Court of Appeals will overturn the Court's other determinations. 
Specifically as to the bind over order, Defendant's argument challenges the 
juvenile court judge's qualifications to hear his case and only collaterally attacks 
the juvenile court's consideration of the five factors that must be analyzed when 
deciding to bind over a defendant to district court. As stated previously, the 
statutory provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78A-6-702(3)( c) require that juvenile 
court judges only consider five specific factors when making bind over 
determinations. Nothing in Defendant's arguments suggests that the juvenile court 
deviated from those factors and none of Defendant's proffered alternative 
conclusions to each of those factors is legally or factually s_ignificant enough to call 
the court's decision into question. 
Furthermore, this Court is not convinced that Defendant's arguments 
regarding the juvenile court judge (specifically her personal and professional 
background) raise an issue of fact or law significant enough to make reversal of the 
bind over reasonably certain. As the Court can find no adequate ground on this 
issue, or as to the arguments supporting Defendant's other post-sentence motions, 
r.• Q ,_ 
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that would warrant the issuance of a certificate of probable cause, the Court will 
refrain from issuing such a certificate. 
Even if the Court were to find a basis to issue the certificate of probable 
cause, the circumstances forming the basis of Defendant's conviction demonstrate 
that it is not in the community's best interest to release him from incarceration. 
The Defendant is serving his current sentence because he pled guilty to robbery-a 
robbery accomplished through home invasion and through Defendant's provision 
of firearms. These are actions and the sort of behavior that can only be 
characterized as absolutely contrary to the societal interests of peace and safety. 
Defendant's age does not mitigate the gravity of these actions. Indeed, the 
severity of his behavior warranted charging him in district court as an adult It 
would be antithetical to the interests-even safety-of the comm.unity to suspend 
the operation of his sentence. Absent grounds to issue a certificate of probable 
cause, and in light of the circumstances of the offense, the Court is not convinced 
that it is appropriate to release defendant from incarceration. 
ORDER 
On the basis of the foregoing rulings, Defendant's Motion to Reinstate 
Appeal of Right from Serious Youth Bindover Order is GRANTED. All other 
motions captioned and discussed herein are hereby DENIED. In accordance with 
granting Defendant's Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious Youth 
Bindover Order, the 30-day period to appeal the bind over order is reinstated. 
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Pursuant to Rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, any such appeal of 
that bind over order must be filed within 30 days of the entry of this Order. 
Dated this 2 ~ day of ,A ~q vt,T2014. 
\ 
~ tl,...__..---
Judge Ernie W. Jones \ 
Utah Second District Court 
• 
• 
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1 SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER AMENDl\iENTS 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 LONGTITLE 
8 Gene~al Description: 
2013 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Chief Sponsor: V. Lowry Snow 
Senate Sponsor: Lyle W. Hillyard 
9 This bill amends the procedure to transfer jurisdiction for a serious youth offender from 
10 a juvenile court to a district court. 
11 ffighlighted Provisions: 
12 This bill: 
13 • provides for a juvenile court judge to consider a minor's prior adjudications in 
14 juvenile court, a minor's best interest, and the public's safety when determining a 
15 jurisdiction transfer from a juvenile court to a district court; and 
16 • makes technical changes. 
l ~ Money Appropriated in this Bill: 
18 None 
·,· 
19 Other Special Clauses: 
20 None 
2t Utah Code Sections Affected: 
22 AMENDS: 
23 
24 
78A-6-702, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2012, Chapter 118 
25 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
26 Section 1. Section 78A-6-702 is amended to read: 
27 78A-6-702. Serious youth offender -- Procedure. 
28 (1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging 
29 a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal information and filed in the 
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30 juvenile court if the information charges any of the following offenses: 
31 (a) any felony violation of: 
32 (i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
33 (ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury to another; 
34 (iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated [kidnapirtg] kidnapping: 
35 (iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; 
36 (v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
37 (vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
38 (vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm; 
39 (viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or 
40 (ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or 
41 (b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the use of a 
42 dangerous weapon.s. which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been 
43 previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon1 
44 which also would have been a felony if committed by an adult. 
45 (2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection 
46 (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court. 
47 (3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1), the 
48 state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of proof to establish 
49 probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed 
50 and that the defendant committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (1 )(b ), the state shall have 
51 the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has 
52 previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous 
53 weapon. 
54 (b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection 
55 (3), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and held to answer in the district 
56 court in the same manner as an adult unless the juvenile court judge finds that [all of the 
57 follorwing conditions exist.] it would be contra:cy to the best interest of the minor and to the 
-2-
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58 public to bind over the defendant to the jurisdiction of the district court. 
59 (c) In making the bind over determination in Subsection (3)(b), the judge shall consider 
60 only the following: 
61 (i) whether the minor has [not] been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense 
62 involving the use of a dangerous we~pon which would be a felony if committed by an adult; 
63 (ii) [that] if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, whether the 
64 minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; [and] 
65 (iii) [that] the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was [not] committed in a 
66 violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner[:]_;_ 
67 
68 
(iv} the number and nature of Ole minor's prior adjudications in the juvenile court; and 
( v} whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the juvenile 
69 court or in the district court. 
70 [(tj-] .@. Once the state has met its burden under [this'] Subsection (3).W. as to a 
'1/ib 71 showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and 
72 presenting evidence [as bJ the existence of the above conditiorxs] that in light of the 
73 considerations listed in Subsection (3)(c), it would be contraty to the best interest of the minor 
74 and the best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district 
75 court. 
76 [~] fu)_ If the juvenile courtjudge finds by clear and convincing evidence that [aH-the 
77 above conditions me satisfied,] it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor and the 
78 best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district court, the 
79 court shall so state in its findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed 
80 upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
81 ( 4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the 
82 state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the defendant over 
83 under Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a minor 
84 and shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
85 (5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall issue. 
-3-
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86 The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be 
87 advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in 
88 accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
89 (6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section, 
90 the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not include a finding of 
91 probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was committed and that the defendant • 
92 committed it, but the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the 
93 additional considerations listed in Subsection (3)(b). 
94 (7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same 
95 information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more 
96 . charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any 
97 subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him shall be considered together with 
98 those charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been 
99 committed and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to 
100 the district court to answer for those charges. 
101 (8) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section, the 
102 jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court over the minor is 
103 terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same criminal episode, 
104 and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against the minor, except as provided in 
105 Subsection (12). 
106 (9) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under this 
107 section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not entitled to a 
108 preliminary examination in the district court. 
109 (10) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has 
110 previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous 
111 weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not need 
112 to be proven at trial in the district court. 
113 (11) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or any 
-4-
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114 other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over 
115 the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
116 (12) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
117 Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there 
118 is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on unspecified dates) 
CHAIRMAN: With that, our first item on the agenda will 
be House Bill, Representative Snow. Representative Snow, the 
time is yours. 
MR. SNOW: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 
committee. The bill before you, HB105 relates to the process in 
the State of Utah whereby we can or the court -- juvenile court 
can in certain cases involving a juvenile offender certify that 
juvenile to the district court to stand trial as an adult, and of 
course if found guilty, to be sentenced as an adult. 
This amendment relates to that process. The current 
code provision is fairly restrictive into how -- as to how that 
process works. First of all, the process only applies to 
juvenile offenders that are 16 years of age or older. Secondly, 
the way that it proceeds is once criminal information is filed 
for one of the offenses that are listed that are subject to being 
certified as an adult, the Court holds a probable cause hearing, 
essentially to determine whether or not there's probable cause to 
believe that the offender has committed one of those offenses, 
and then also as part of that, to determine whether or not the 
juvenile offender was has previously been in the juvenile 
system and has committed an offense using a dangerous weapon. 
If those burdens are met, then the Court under the 
current statutory scheme goes through a fairly narrow process in 
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determining whether or not this offender ought to be certified as 
an adult. The standard of evidence in that determination is by 
clear and convincing evidence, and the Court looks -- under the 
current statute the Court looks at three elements: whether or not 
this offender was previously adjudicated for an offense involving 
a dangerous weapon, whether or not if it was that the activity 
involved one or more co-defendants, whether or not this 
particular minor's culpability was less than the others, and 
whether or not there were elements of aggravated nature, a 
violent element, aggressive or premeditated element. 
Once those are met under our current code, the juvenile 
court judge really has no discretion. Once those are met, then 
the way the law is written, he or she sitting as the judge must 
certify that offender to district court, and then the offender 
goes through adult court to face those charges. Now clearly 
there are some crimes that are so egregious and heinous in their 
nature and by their facts that this was the reason this provision 
exists in the code. 
Now the purpose of the amendment is to keep that process 
and that procedure in place, but to add an element of discretion 
or a greater element of discretion in those cases where, 
according to the amendment, it would be in the best interest 
of the minor and the public to bind the defendant over to the 
jurisdiction of the court -- of the district court, but must meet 
in addition to the three elements that I've indicate. 
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The Court would also have a right to look at the nature 
and number of the prior adjudicated offenses, and also an overall 
determination analysis, is the public safety better served by 
adjudicating the minor in the juvenile court or in the district 
court. 
Seated to my right, I should -- Mr. Chairman, members of 
the committee, I think most of you know Director Jacey Skinner, 
who is the director for the Utah Sentencing Commission. Before I 
take questions on the amendment, if it's okay, Mr. Chairman, I'd 
like to turn some time to Director Skinner to provide the 
committee with a little more context and history as to how this 
came about, this amendment, what the genesis was for it and why 
the director and her board believes that this is a proper 
amendment for the committee to consider and eventually be passed 
into law. Is that acceptable? 
CHAIRMAN: That would great. Ms. Skinner, if you'll 
just introduce yourself. 
MS. SKINNER: My name is Jacey Skinner. As mentioned, 
I'm the director of the Utah Sentencing Commission. Before I get 
started, I just wanted to thank you Representative Snow for his 
help with this particular bill. He's been very dedicated and 
helpful in helping us move those forward. 
As was mentioned, this -- this bill deals with our 
serious youth offender statute. To give you a little bit of 
history, I've provided a chart there. You should all have one. 
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It's entitled Utah Juvenile Transfer and Custody Laws. It 
explains the different methods by which we currently under our 
current law transfer juveniles from the juvenile court to the 
criminal system or the adult system. There are three methods. 
There is one which we call just statutory jurisdiction 
or where it's by -- by law, the crime is automatically filed in a 
criminal court. These cases are fairly narrow, but they're when 
the minor is 16 years of age or older and commits an offense that 
9 would me murder, aggravated murder. Those offenses are filed 
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directly there, and there's no question there. Or if they've 
previously been transferred to the adult court -- to criminal 
court -- any case after that point is filed in that particular 
area. 
We also have a process called certification which is 
more of a discretionary waiver where it doesn't fall into any 
particular type of crime, but if the prosecutor feels like 
transfer may be warranted, they can file an information and put 
on a certification hearing for the judge where the judge has a 
lot of discretion to determine whether or not it's in the 
interest of the public or in the interest of the juvenile to 
transfer them to juvenile court. 
Then we have in the middle what we call a presumptive 
waiver type of a situation where and this is the statute that 
we're focusing on today which is called serious youth offender. 
It's a presumptive waiver which means that for a violation of any 
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of the crimes that you see listed there, that it's presumed that 
the juvenile will be transferred. Now as Mr. Representative Snow 
3 mentioned, the factors that exist that the Court has to find are 
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quite narrow and very well defined. After preliminary hearing 
the Court is asked to find -- to hold a retention factor hearing 
in which they are asked to find some of the following 
circumstances. It's a little awkward to follow because it's --
they must find that all of the circumstances exist, and they're 
kind of negative findings, so I'll walk you through them. 
So they -- the Court must find that the minor has not 
been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving a 
dangerous weapon. They must also find that if the offense is 
committed with one or more other persons, the minor appears to 
have a lesser degree of culpability than the co-defendants, and 
that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a 
violent, aggressive or premeditated manner. 
Because the Court must find all of these to exist, it's 
really difficult for them to ever retain a juvenile. So while we 
give the appearance that the judges have some discretion here and 
that they're making a decision, really, given the nature of these 
offenses -- and these are serious offenses. I don't -- I don't 
mean to lessen the degree of their seriousness at all. 
For instance, an aggravated burglary, it's very 
difficult to commit an aggravated burglary in a non-aggressive 
manner. So by the very nature that the Court has found that the 
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probable cause exists, even if the minor has not been previously 
adjudicated delinquent for a weapon, even if there the offense 
was committed in concert with more than one person and their role 
in the crime was very minor, the fact that the crime itself was 
aggressive means that the Court has to bind them over. 
I became the director of this commission about four 
years ago, and one of the very first things that my commission 
started saying that they wanted to look at was this particular 
statute for that reason. All mem -- everyone involved felt 
like their hands were kind of tied. The Court said that these 
cases -- or the law says that these cases must be filed this 
way, and the juvenile court judges have really no discretion in 
deciding whether or not this juvenile should be transferred. 
The reason that this is frustrating for them is that 
they really may have a juvenile who has no previous history 
whatsoever; this is their first interaction with the juvenile 
court. Their role may have been a minor one. But again, because 
of the nature of the crime, they are -- they're transferred to 
the district court system. 
The prosecutors don't always think that that should be 
the case. The defense attorneys obviously don't think that that 
should be the case, and the judges are often frustrated that they 
are forced, because of the way the law is written, to transfer 
them. 
What happens when they are then transferred into the 
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district court is where we -- we're giving them these harsh adult 
sentences, is given the fact that they are very young, that they 
have no criminal history and that their role in the offense 
was -- may have been rather minor, we often see them being placed 
5 on probation, which is not really the purpose of sending someone 
6 to district court. 
7 If we think about why we would be transferring someone 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
to the adult court from the juvenile court, I think there are 
two questions that we have to ask. First, is the harsher adult 
sentence needed. I would characterize that is that a sentence of 
a length and duration longer than we would have jurisdiction in 
the juvenile court needed as retribution or for public safety 
reasons in the adult system. 
Now in the juvenile court we can maintain jurisdiction 
until a juvenile is 21-years-old. The average age for these 
16 offenders is that they are 16. When they are transferred to the 
17 adult system, even if they are sanctioned, if they're sent to 
18 prison, we find nationally that the length of stay for juvenile 
19 
20 
21 
22 
offenders transferred to the adult system is a little over three 
years. The reality is they will be returned to the community. 
They will still be very young when they are returned to the 
community, and the question is, how are we going to be returning 
23 them to the community. 
24 The next question that we have to ask is did the 
25 transfer to adult court actually reduce the crime component or 
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future crime that will be committed. There have been a lot of 
studies of transfer laws across the country. One of the reasons 
for that is in the early '80 1 s and the early '90 1 s, which is 
or excuse me, the late '80 1 s, early '90's, which is when our law 
was passed as well in its current form, I should say, there was a 
serious increase in concern about juvenile crime in the country, 
particularly a lot of offenders who were repeat offenders and 
very serious. They kind of coined the phrase super predator, and 
they expected these juveniles to become just very serious 
dangerous criminals, and so these laws were passed to remove them 
from the juvenile court system, to deal with them in the adult 
system, and to -- essentially the plan was to lock them up for a 
very long period of time. 
What we've seen since that time is that that forecast 
hasn't really played out. In fact, the cases have diminished 
significantly, and what we found is that the transfer to the 
adult system hasn't really paid off the way that we anticipated 
that it would. 
For instance, soon after our law was passed, we started 
having questions as to whether or not it was effective. In 2002 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice's study of the 
serious youth offender and transfer cases. In that year there 
were 65 juveniles that were identified as serious youth 
offenders. I can go through what happened there. In that case 
about half of them were placed on probation in 2002. 
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Looking at the same cases for last year, we were able to 
identify 11 total transfer cases -- now that included -- that 
includes certification cases and serious youth offender cases. 
There were five total serious youth offender cases last year. 
So as we can see, these cases have dropped off 
dramatically. Out of those, three of them were placed in prison, 
two of them were placed on probation. The two that were placed 
on probation were -- when we look at their offenses, we can 
assume that the judge looked at the case and said, again, this is 
not a serious enough of an offense -- or not offense, but doesn't 
warrant a prison sentence in this particular instance. So there 
are lots of things that a district court judge takes into play 
when they're making that sentence. 
What we are trying to do with this particular amendment 
is to not change that system altogether. We recognize that there 
are very serious crimes that are committed by young people in our 
community. Some of those cannot be dealt with appropriately in 
the juvenile court system. Some of them -- some of them warrant 
for public safety reasons being transferred. The phrase that 
you'll always here with these laws is that they were created to 
deal with the juveniles, the worst of the worst, and those who 
had exhausted the resources of the juvenile court system. 
As we can see through these factors that exist right 
now, the juvenile's history doesn't really come into play. It 
can be the juvenile's first offense, their first interaction with 
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the court system, and they could end up being transferred. So 
that exhausting the resources of the juvenile court system 
doesn't become a factor. 
The worst of the worst does come into play with these 
are the worst offenses that we do see, but it doesn't necessarily 
mean that the minor's role was the worst in them. As you all 
know, different facts come into each particular scenario, and we 
need to be able to look at them. 
My commission, as you know, is charged with maintaining 
maximum discretion for and encouraging discretion for sentencing 
judges. This is one of those areas where we feel like we really 
need to make some improvement. So this amendment is trying to do 
just that, is to provide that -- that discretion in making those 
decisions. 
As you can see, rather than a shall bind them over if 
all of the following factors are found, the standard becomes --
and this is in line 57 -- they shall bind them over unless the 
Court finds it will be contrary to the best interest of the minor 
and the public not to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction 
of the district court. That is an and. 
So we are looking at both of these -- both of these 
factors corning into play, particularly when I asked the two 
questions before one can ask, how is it in the best interest of 
the public not to bind them over. We may find that the juvenile 
will be much better served in the juvenile court system where we 
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can provide them services that do very well at reducing 
recidivism rather than transferring them to a system that is not 
equipped to deal with juveniles, particularly if they are placed 
on probation, they're not going to receive those services that 
may help reduce their criminogenic needs in the same way that 
they would be able to receive in the juvenile court system. 
In reviewing transfer laws, we do find that particular 
for violent offenses, a juvenile who is maintained in the 
juvenile court system versus a juvenile that's transferred to the 
criminal system or the adult system, we find consistently that 
those who are transferred to the adult system for violent 
offenses reoffend more frequently and sooner than those who are 
maintained in the juvenile court system. 
So again, recognizing that we do have a need in some 
instances to make these transfers, we want to make sure that that 
can happen, but we want to give the judge the opportunity to look 
at this particular minor, their interaction with the juvenile 
court system before, the nature of the offense before them, and 
to make an appropriate decision as to whether or not the public 
and the minor would be best served in the juvenile court or in 
the criminal court system. With that, I think I'd be open to any 
questions. Ci) 
CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Ms. Skinner. I do have 
a question here. Representative Aaron? 
MS. AARON: Thank you. Just first question, when you 
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talk about line 58, you -- both times you referred to that line 
you said not to bindover. There's no not in that sentence. I 
want to make sure we're clear on that. 
MS. SKINNER: Yes. They will bindover if they find that 
it -- or excuse me, unless -- there's an unless there on 56. 
MS. AARON: Right. 
MS. SKINNER: So unless they find it would be contrary 
to the interest of the minor and to the public. 
MS. AARON: Thank you. Could you tell me a little bit 
about your studies in terms of -- I know some of these have an 
age limit of 14, some of them have 16. Have you done any 
analysis of that in terms of how often they've bound over? 
MS. SKINNER: These are age limits for the statutes 
themselves, so because of the different nature of the statutes, 
it -- the presumption is a little bit different. So 
certification cases aren't filed nearly as frequently. This is 
14 years of age or older. They're not filed as frequently, but 
are -- are filed. 
When they are, cases that I looked at from last year, 
they were all bound over, but I don't have -- I can't say with 
I can't say that there weren't others that were considered to be 
filed that way that -- this isn't making any sense as I'm saying 
this, but those numbers didn't show up because they didn't reach 
the transfer level, and so they maintained themselves in the 
juvenile court system. 
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1 So those that we looked over and in talking with 
2 prosecutors and defense attorneys, I'm not aware of any from last 
3 
4 
year -- I can say that -- that were not bound over. Those are 
usually at -- done after giving a lot of thought and large 
5 hearings that are placed on. 
6 With the serious youth offender, again it does -- pardon 
7 me. It does depend on their age. Now again, these are the cases 
8 
9 
10 
11 
that are bound over that we're looking at. What we do know, and 
this comes from both judges and from prosecutors is that when 
they look at a child, one who may be younger or has lesser 
culpability, that oftentimes because the statute is so 
12 restrictive, they're finding other ways to make their way around 
13 the statute. So they'll file one of the charges that is not on 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
the list, or they will come to some other kind of agreement in 
order to avoid this, because the statute really does require that 
transfer. Does that answer your question? 
MS. AARON: Yes, it does. Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN: Do we have any other questions? 
19 Representative Hall? 
20 MR. HALL: Could you just discuss the fiscal note that 
21 we have related to this bill? I don't -- either Ms. Skinner or 
22 Representative Snow. Ii) 
23 
24 
25 
MS. SKINNER: There is a fiscal note on the bill. This 
is coming from juvenile justice services. They are estimating 
that -- a couple of things. They're estimating that with the --
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with the change to the statute that there will be more cases 
filed. I can only assume that this would be because the statute 
will give some discretion. Those cases that are now being filed 
outside of the statute in an effort to avoid the requirements 
5 will now be filed under the particular statute, so the cases may 
6 increase. 
7 What I can tell you, though, is that they are cases that 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
if they're trying to avoid the statute to begin with, I think 
they're the cases that both the prosecutor and the judge feel 
like may be retained under this particular statute given that 
option. So I don't think that it would increase. Those are kids 
that are already staying in the juvenile court system. 
What JJS is estimating is that with this statute there 
will be juveniles who are currently being sent to the district 
court system who will be maintained in the juvenile court system, 
and accordingly, they will need to provide services for those 
juveniles. So that's what the fiscal note is based on. They're 
estimating that most of those will go to secure care. That is 
their estimate. 
MR. HALL: Do you have any reason to disagree with the 
amount? 
MS. SKINNER: It's really hard to know. As I said 
before, we don't know how many cases will -- each year the cases 
differ, and we do expect that they will be changed a little bit. 
In my -- in looking at the cases that have been filed over the 
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last few years, we do have a large number of those cases where 
the juveniles really do~'t have any prior history at all. 
When they are transferred to the adult system, their cases are 
greatly -- in the course of a plea bargain greatly reduced. 
Like I said, they're placed on probation in many 
cases. Those juveniles are what I would classify as lower risk 
offenders, and it's hard to know what would happen with them in 
the juvenile court system, if the Court would them to secure 
care, and if all of these juveniles are retained and are sent to 
secure care, then that probably is an accurate estimate. 
If they are not, if they are retained and placed on 
probation or given some other services, to that I don't think 
the fiscal note would arise to that amount. 
It's also, as I said, difficult to know the numbers. 
They're estimating -- I can't remember if it's four or six 
juveniles that will be retained in addition to those that are 
currently retained. As I said, last year we had a total of five 
cases total, and so it's hard to know where those will coming 
from -- will be coming from. 
MR. HALL: Thank you. 
MR. LOWRY: Can I weigh on that a little bit, too? I 
certainly don't have the background that the director has, but I 
think the feeling is anecdotally that for those whose -- when 
jurisdiction is transferred to the district court and those 
juveniles or those offenders are placed on probation, the 
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1 probation department for adults is really not equipped to deal 
2 specifically or as well for juvenile offenders as juvenile 
3 probation officers. 
4 So while there may be some savings at that point, 
5 ultimately there is a high risk that we're going to see those 
6 folks back into the system, as Ms. Skinner as already alluded to. 
7 So ultimately, and in the long run we think that there is a good 
8 chance that the State is going to spend more money as those youth 
9 offenders mature and they -- and their issues are not addressed, 
10 we're going to see them again and it's going to cost more money 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
in the long run. Does that make sense? 
MR. HALL: Sure. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN: Any other questions? I have one as the 
chair. I'm just curious, I mean I know we've been talking a lot 
about juvenile court -- or juvenile facilities being shut down. 
16 Will -- on the fiscal note, are we going to be able to help the 
17 juvenile facility folks be able to deal with some of the issues 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
that we're so concerned with in not shutting some of these 
facilities down and giving them the resources to deal with the 
problems that they don't have? Do you happen to know? 
MS. SKINNER: I'm sure any resources that are allotted 
to their system will be helpful in helping them maintain this. 
These -- the estimates here are for juveniles that are placed in 
secure care and in community based placements. Those are the 
estimates that they maintain. I'm not sure if the money that 
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would be dedicated based on this particular offense would be 
dedicated to those facilities or those programs, or if they could 
be used for some of the other programs. I'm not sure how that 
would -- how that would play out. I can find out for you. 
CHAIRMAN: That would be great. The other concern I 
would have is -- I mean there's been talk last year, we almost 
had one of our facilities shut down, and obviously we're going 
this direction, which I think is a worthy direction to go in, but 
if you suddenly shut down a facility and then we'd have no place 
to put these -- these youth, that creates a huge bind in our 
system, so I'm just kind of -- wanted to make sure on that. 
MS. SKINNER: It does, yes. 
CHAIRMAN: Any other questions? Do we have anybody in 
the audience that would like to address this issue? Please come 
forward and state your name. 
MR. GORDON: I'm Ron Gordon, the executive director of 
the commission on criminal and juvenile justice. The original 
serious youth offender law was passed in 1996. My office was 
involved in the law at that time, and we've remained involved 
with this while over the course of those intervening 17 years. 
We've made a number of relatively minor changes to the 
law over the -- that time, and I'm here today in support. My 
commission, my office supports this bill as an important change 
to ensure the integrity of the serious youth offender law. 
The point of the law is to find appropriate ways to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
-19-
address the most serious juveniles, and the current law does not 
allow adequate flexibility. So the bill that Representative Snow 
is bringing forth strikes a very delicate balance between 
providing additional discretion to juvenile court judges in 
certain circumstances, while also maintaining public safety. The 
focus of the bill remains public safety. 
A juvenile court judge is not permitted to retain a 
juvenile if that harms public safety or is not in the best 
interest of public safety. It does permit the juvenile court 
some discretion to retain some juveniles when it is not a threat 
to the public safety and will provide in better services being 
delivered to that juvenile, which only increases the overall 
public safety. 
So my commission stands in full support of the bill. 
We extend appreciation to Representative Snow for bringing this 
forward to the sentencing commission for studying it over many 
years, and as I said before, it strikes a delicate balance 
18 between the discretion that's necessary to make these very 
19 
20 
21 
22 
difficult decisions while also maintaining public safety. 
CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Any questions for Mr. Gordon? 
Seeing none, thank you. Anybody else? Oh, yes. 
MR. BOYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Paul Boyden, 
23 executive director of Statewide Association of Prosecutors. We 
24 have been involved in this issue, obviously, for a long time. We 
25 helped draft the original 18 years ago, and these retention 
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factors have been a concern all along. I've been on the 
sentencing commission, and of course involved with the prosecutor 
for that length of time. 
This is not a minor change. This is significant. We're 
5 talking about changing these factors so that the Court -- so that 
6 the discretion goes to the Court, because de facto the way it 
7 operates right now is the prosecutors are kind of making the 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
decision on what to charge as to whether this is going to end up 
in the adult court or the juvenile court. 
Nobody likes to give up power, of course. That would 
include prosecutors, but we do understand that this is the kind 
of thing where really the judges need a little more discretion on 
this kind of thing. We need to -- we need to adjust these 
factors because they just are -- they have been a problem all 
along, and so we really need to deal with those issues. 
The big concern we have is we just -- we're trusting the 
juvenile court judges at this time to make those decisions, and 
particularly to take into account the needs of the public because 
in criminal prosecution, it's very important for the public to 
feel that justice is being done. In some cases they feel that 
21 juveniles should be tried as adults, and that's an important 
22 issue for justice to be done. 
23 So we're probably never going to be entirely through 
24 with tweaking these issues, but we certainly don't oppose this. 
25 We've been involved in the process all along for a very long 
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time. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Boyden. Do we have any 
questions? No. Thank you. Anyone else from the audience? If 
not, I'll bring it back to the committee for any other clarifying 
questions. If not, we'll go back to Representative Snow for 
summation. 
MR. SNOW: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say that 
I appreciate Director Skinner and for all of her work and the 
work of the commission and all those who have helped coordinate 
on drafting this bill. This has been a long process, and I think 
they have indicated -- those that have spoke today -- this is 
something that's been thought through for a long period of time. 
It's supported by Statewide Association of Prosecutors, CCJJ, 
Utah Sentencing Commission and the Council of Juvenile Court 
Judges in this state, so it has -- it has broad support. 
It's a good change. It allows in a very narrow 
situation discretion on the part of the juvenile court judges 
and by the way, we have some great judges sitting on our juvenile 
court benches. It offers in a very narrow situation discretion 
in whether in making a proper decision on whether or not to 
transfer jurisdiction to adult court in those situations where 
the best interests of the public will be served, as well as the 
best interests of the minor. So I believe that it's an 
appropriate change. It's a good change in our judicial criminal 
policy, and I would look for support from the committee. Thank 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
-22-
you, Mr. Chairman. 
(Conclusion of Mr. Snow's comments) 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: House Bill 105. 
MADAME CLERK: House Bill 105, serious youth offender 
amendments. Senator Hillyard? 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Senator Hillyard? 
MR. HILLYARD: In juvenile court we have a provision for 
serious youth offenders which requires them to be certified as 
adults, and it's usually somebody 16, 17-years-old who have 
committed a horrific crime. The problem has been the way the 
statute has been drawn it's pretty well automatic. This 
amendment makes it more discretionary with the Court, because 
some of the kids are being certified over. When they get in 
adult court are just released on probation and not given help 
that the juvenile court can give and structure to do. 
So this is brought to us by the CCJJ in a leveling 
influence to allow a little bit more discretion in the juvenile 
court to make sure that the people who should be punished are 
19 punished, and those who may need some treatment (inaudible) 
20 process have that opportunity. Be glad to respond to any 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
questions. 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Thank you, Senator. Questions for 
Senator Hillyard? 
MR. HILLYARD: I'll call for question on the bill. 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Seeing none -- and the question is 
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1 shall House Bill 105 pass? Roll call vote. 
2 {Conclusion of Senator Hillyard's remarks) 
3 SPEAKER PRO TEM: Madame reading clerk? 
4 MADAME CLERK: House Bill 105, serious youth offender 
5 amendments, Representative Snow. This bill was heard in 
6 judiciary with a vote of 7-0-2. 
7 SPEAKER PRO TEM: Representative Snow. 
8 MR. SNOW: Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern. As this body 
9 knows, our criminal justice system in the State of Utah is 
10 divided into two parts, one that deals with adult offenders and 
11 one that deals with juvenile offenders. This particular bill 
12 deals with juvenile offenders whose crimes alleged are serious 
13 enough that a prosecutor who is prosecuting those may feel 
14 inclined to transfer them to adult court to stand trial as an 
15 adult and ultimately be sentenced, and perhaps even incarcerated 
16 as an adult. 
17 Now currently in Utah there are three ways that can be 
18 accomplished. House Bill 105 deals only with one particular 
19 process, and let me tell you why I'm bringing the bill. Under 
20 that process as it exists today, an offender -- a youth offender 
21 who qualifies, over the age of 16, and who has committed one of 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the offenses enumerated, fairly serious offenses at lines 31 
through 44, his case or her case can be transferred to adult 
court after a hearing is held in juvenile court before the 
juvenile court judge, and as long as certain elements are met. 
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Now if those elements are met, the juvenile court judge 
sitting and hearing the case has no discretion except to bind 
that young person over to stand trial as an adult. It is that 
4 rigidity in the bill that prompts me bringing -- or excuse me, it 
5 is that rigidity in the existing law that prompts me bringing 
6 this bill. 
7 Now I will tell you that this bill that is before you 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
has been worked on at least for two years. It is supported by 
the commission on criminal and juvenile justice, the Utah 
sentencing commission, the Utah Juvenile Justice Service, and 
also by the Statewide Association of Prosecutors. 
What does the bill do? It keeps in place the procedure 
13 where those who have been charged with serious offenses can still 
14 be transferred to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court; 
15 however, it broadens the discretion of the Court. 
16 
17 
18 
Now why is that necessary? Under the current rigid 
structure, we actually have unintended consequences where a 
juvenile under this scenario who meets those requirements, maybe 
19 has very limited involvement with the juvenile court previously, 
20 but meets those elements, could be transferred to the district 
21 court, and either plead guilty or be found guilty and then stand 
22 before that Court for sentencing. 
23 The problem with the current system is the -- if the 
24 offense is not of such a magnitude that the Court would be 
25 inclined to impose a jail sentence or imprisonment on that 
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juvenile, the Court most likely is inclined to order probation. 
The problem with that scenario is our adult probation in this 
state is not really equipped to deal with a juvenile -- juvenile 
supervision. 
5 As a result, and as an unintended consequence, 
6 those serious youth offenders who then are transferred to a 
7 probation -- adult probation -- have very limited supervision. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Their supervision terminates after a period of time, and the 
youth offender is not really -- and his or her issues are not 
really addressed, at least to the same extent that they would be 
under a juvenile court supervised probation. 
Now the standard by which a juvenile court judge making 
that determination is fairly significant. The juvenile court 
judge before they would retain this offender in juvenile court 
would have to make two findings, one that it's in the best 
interest of the juvenile, that jurisdiction be retained in the 
juvenile court, and the second, that it's in the best interest of 
the safety and welfare of the citizens of this state. So it's a 
fairly narrow band in which a juvenile offender would -- who had 
committed some serious offense whose jurisdiction would be 
retained. 
The benefit would be on retention in the juvenile court 
system whether it -- whether it required detention or whether it 
required supervision is our system in this state is then able to 
address the needs of that juvenile, and the likelihood of 
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reoffending is much less. In fact, the statistics show across 
the country that in cases where a juvenile is tried as an adult 
and then is put on probation as an adult -- under adult 
supervision, the recidivism, the rate at which they reoffend is 
5 higher than if that same juvenile were maintained under the 
6 jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
7 Now that's a lot of talking to say that this bill 
8 provides additional discretion to our juvenile court judges to 
9 make the right decision in deciding whether or not to transfer a 
10 juvenile offender for serious offenses to the district court to 
11 stand trial or to be sentenced. I'm ready to take questions. 
12 Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Thank you, Representative Snow. 
Discussion to the bill? Representative King? 
MR. KING: Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern. Will the 
sponsor yield? 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Will the sponsor yield? 
MR. LOWRY: Yes, sure. 
MR. KING: If you could, Representative, could you 
explain for us the fiscal note? 
MR. LOWRY: There is a fiscal note that is appended to 
this bill, and I think if you -- you each have a copy of that. 
23 The fiscal bill current impact appears based on meetings that has 
24 been held with the fiscal analyst as recently as this afternoon 
25 is that that impact is probably going to be reduced, and I 
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don't -- you don't have it front of you in writing, but I believe 
it's going to be reduced to about $50,000. 
Now it is true there is an impact, but if we -- we have 
to decide, I suppose, from policy standpoint whether or not the 
long term costs and risks associated with moving those juvenile 
offenders who commit serious offenses to the adult system, their 
chances of reoffending, and there's a saying among juvenile court 
officers and those who supervise juveniles, and it goes something 
like this. Once we take a juvenile and we put them in a certain 
environment -- in jail or in prison with adults, criminals -- you 
have almost certainly created another criminal and a serious 
criminal once that juvenile is released. 
So while it is true that, Representative, that there is 
a fiscal note, my understanding is No. 1, it can be mitigated, 
and No. 2, it's my position that this is a good policy, and we'll 
have to deal with that, but it's good policy for the State in the 
long run to assume that cost rather than creating long range 
issues that we're going to have to deal with later. 
MR. KING: Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern. I want to 
address that point. One of the things that you'd look at if you 
look carefully at the fiscal note is there is some savings to the 
cost of administering the adult justice system because of this, 
and there is some additional expenditure to the juvenile justice 
system. I don't -- it's not troubling to me that we're spending 
more money on the juvenile justice system with these kids. I 
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1 think this is a great bill. 
2 I commend the bill sponsor for his work on this because 
3 giving greater discretion to keep juveniles out of the adult 
4 system who should in the minds of those working in the juvenile 
5 system be kept in the juvenile system is -- increases the 
6 likelihood that we're going to be able to have those kids given 
7 the resources that they need to keep them from reoffender, to 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
keep them from recidivating. That's a positive thing. This is, 
in my mind, an investment in the future of these kids. I'm glad 
to hear that the fiscal note is lower than what the bill sponsor 
originally obtained. 
I think that's a good thing, but I don't want the body 
to be deterred by the existence of a fiscal note at all, because 
the resources that we're talking about are going in to helping 
rehabilitate these kids before they become habitual offenders or 
16 become -- or before they become adults. So I would encourage 
17 
18 
your support of this bill. Thank you. 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Further discussion to the bill, 
19 Representative Mciff? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. MCIFF: Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern. I wish to 
offer a simple analogy to make a point. If you want to be a good 
horseman, you have to know when to pull back on the reins and 
when to ease off, but you can never know that until you're in 
the saddle and you see what the horse does. That same concept 
applies to young peopie. It is impossible for us to statutorily 
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fix whether a youth should be tried as an adult or as a juvenile, 
and that decision cannot be fairly and realistically made until 
you're in the saddle, and the youth is before the Court, the 
Court can evaluate all the considerations related to this young 
5 person and the offense that's been committed. So I agree, this 
~ 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
is sound public policy, and we should support the bill. 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Representative Mciff. Further 
discussion to the bill? Seeing none, Representative Snow for 
summation. 
MR. SNOW: Thank you. In summary, No. 1, this does not 
change or do away with the process that we have in our state 
where some serious youth offenders ought to be tried as an adult, 
and in some cases in very egregious cases ought to -- ought to be 
incarcerated as an adult. That still remains in place. 
15 The second thing, this bill, as has been mentioned, 
16 provides some discretion -- addition discretion to juvenile court 
17 judges to help make a decision that's in the best interest of the 
18 person charged, but also in the best interests of the public. 
19 The third thing that I'd mention with respect to the fiscal bill, 
20 one way or another, whether that juvenile is going to supervised 
21 or incarcerated as an adult or supervised as a juvenile, there is 
22 going to be a cost. 
23 There is a little more -- there is -- not a little more. 
24 There is a greater cost in the structure that we build with 
25 respect to supervising and rehabilitating juveniles, but in the 
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1 
2 
3 
long run, I believe it's money well spent in the state, and I 
urge your support. Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern. 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Thank you, Representative Snow. 
4 Voting is open on House Bill 105. 
5 (Conclusion of Mr. Lowry's statements) 
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Utah Session Laws of the 2013 l,eglslatlve Session 
HB 105, Chapter 186 
Be It enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section l. Section 78A-6-702 is amended to read: 
78A-6-702. Serious youth offender -- Procedure. 
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall 
filed in the juvenile court if the information charges any of the following offenses: 
(a) any felony violation of: 
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson: 
(ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury to another; 
(Iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated [k:ldflapiflg) kidnappjng; 
(Iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; 
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm: 
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or 
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or 
(b) an offense other than those listed In Subsection (1 )(a) involving the use of a dangerous weapon ... which would be a felony if committed b 
been previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon.._which also would have been a felony If co 
(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules e! 
Court. 
(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed In Subsection (1 ), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its c, 
establish probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (l) has been committed and that the defendant committed it 
(l )(b), the state shall have the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has previously been adj1 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon. 
(b) If the Juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection (3), the court shall order that the defendant be boun, 
district court in the same manner as an adult unless the Juvenile court judge finds that [all ef the fellooiflg eonelitior1s exist:] jt would be co 
mjnor and to the public to bing over the defendant to the jur;sdictjon of the district ,ourt 
Cc) In making the bind over determination in Subsection (3)(b) the judge shall consider only the following: 
4j http://cascmakerlegal.com/bDocView.aspx'?categoryAlias=ACTS&state=UT &strdataTypc=ACl'&catCalled=Acts&slalecd=lIT &sessionyr=20I3&actid=HB%20105... J /2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I0!?./20!7 Casc:makn 
(i) whethe_r the minor has l11er] been previously adjudicated delinouent fo~ an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapo:1 which woult 
{ ..... ,l,. 
(ii) [th-at] if the offense was committed with one or more other persons,~ the minor appears to have a greater Qr lesser degree of cul 
{i:lfld] 
(iii) [tl'tttt] the .exteot tQ,wbi<;h the minor's role in the offense was [net] committed in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner[:t 
{iv) the number and na~ure of the minor's prior. adjudications in the jµvenile co~Jrt· and 
(v} ~hether public safety is better serv~d by apjudlc;atjng t.he roi_oqr in the iuxen_Ue court or in the d;stciCl cou_rt 
[(€),].@ Once the state has met its burden under [tht5-] Subsection (3)00 as to a showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the bu, 
presenting evidence [as to tl,e existenee .e,f the abe .. e eonditions] tbat in ljght gf the consideratjgns_ ljsted in Subsectiqn <~)Ccl jt wc;>yld be c 
minor and the best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdi~tion of the district court. 
[Ml f.el If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that [all the above eenditien:; are satisfied,] jt wgyld be contrarv tc 
and the. best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdictign of the district ~urt the court shall so state In Its findings 
as a minor and shall proceed upon the information as though It were a juvenile petition. 
(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the state has not met its burden of proving the other crite 
over under Subsection (1 ), the juvenile court Judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the informatlc (i 
petition. 
(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall Issue. 
The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile courtjud~ 
initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section, the preliminary examination held by thejuvenile cou 
finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was committed and that the defendant committed It, but the Juvenile cot 
with this section regarding the additional considerations listed in Subsection (3}(b). 
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the< 
charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged, 
together with those charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the defe (ti];\ 
defendant shall also be bound over to the district court to answer for those charges. 181 
(8) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section, the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services an• 
is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felc 
except as provided in Subsection (12). 
(9) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult In the district court under this section or on whom an indictment has been returned b~ 
preliminary examination in the district court. (i) 
(1 O) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense i 
weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court. 
(11) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or any other offense arising from the same crlmlnal episode, t 
jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
(12) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previous 
there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court. 
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tUJLE 1.2 - Promntini!' Confidence in the Judici;1rv 
,., 'I -
A judge should act at all times in a manner that promotes - and shall not undermine - public 
confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciaiy and shall avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. 
COMMENT 
[1 J Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by improper conduct and conduct that creates the appearance of 
impropriery. This princi.ple applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge. 
[2] A judge should expect to be the subfect of public scrutiny that might be viewed as burdensome if applied to 
other citizens, and must accept the restrictions imposed by the Code. 
{3 J Conduct that compromises or appears to compromise the independence, integri"!], and impartiali!J of a 
judge undmnines public confidence in the judiciary. Because it is not practicable to list all such conduct, the 
Rule is necessari/y cast in general terms. 
[4 J Judges should participate in activities that promote ethical conduct amongjudges and laU!Jers, support 
professionalism within the judiciary and the legal profession, and promote access to justice far all. 
[5] Actual improprieties include violations of law or provisions of this Code. The test for appearance of 
impropriery is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge engaged in 
impropriery. 
[6} A judge should initiate and participate in communiry outreach activities far the purpose of promoting 
public understanding of and confidence in the administration ofjustice. In conducting such activities, the judge 
must act in a ,nanner consistent with this Code. 
RULE 2.11- Disqualification 
(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following 
circumstances: 
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or 
personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding. 
(2) The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner, or a person 
within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner 
of such a person is: 
(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, managmg member, or 
trustee of a party; 
(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
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(c) a person who has more than a de rninimis interest that could be substantially affected by 
the proceeding; or 
(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. 
(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, 
domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the judge's family residing .ip. the 
judge's household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party 
to the proceeding. 
( 4) The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party, a party's lawyer, or 
the law firm of a party's lawyer has within the previous three years made aggregate 
contributions to the judge's retention in an amount that is greater than $50. 
(5) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public statement, other than 
in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit the 
judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy. 
(6) The judge: 
(a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a lawyer who 
participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association; 
(b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated personally and 
substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly 
expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in 
controversy; 
(c) was a material witness concerning the matter; or 
( d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court and is now acting as a 
judge who would hear the appeal or trial de novo. 
(B) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic interests, 
and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the 
judge's spouse or domestic partner and mmor children residing in the judge's household. 
(C) A judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under 
paragraph (A)(1), may disclose on the record the basis of the judge's disqualification and may 
ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court 
personnel, whether to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and 
lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court personnel, that the judge should 
not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be 
incorporated into the record of the proceeding. 
COMMENT 
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[1] Under this Rule, a judge is disqttalified 111he11cver the judge's impartiality might reasonab!J be questioned, 
regardless of whether Of!J ~r the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1) through (6) appfy. 
[2} A judge's obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applz'es regardless 
of whether a motion to disqualify is filed 
[3] The rule of necessity may ovenidc the rule of disqualification. ror example, a judge might be required to 
participate in judicial revie1v of a jztdicial salary statute, or might be the on!J judge available in a matter 
requiring immediate judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining order. In 
matters that require immediate action, the judge must disclose on the record the basis for possible 
disqualification and make reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to another judge as soon as practicable. 
{4] A judge is disqualified in proceedings involving a law firm that employs the judge's spouse, domestic 
partner, parent, or child, or e11!J other member of the judge's fami!J residing in the judge's household as an 
equity holder in the law firm. A judge is not disqualified in other situations unless the judge's impartiali'!] 
might reasonab!J be questioned under paragraph (A), or a relative is known by the judge to have an interest 
in the law firm that could be substantial!J affected by the proceeding under paragraph (A)(2)(C). 
[5} A judge should disclose on the record info1111ation that the judge believes the parties or their la1J!Yers might 
reasonabfy consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualijication, even if the judge believes there is no basis 
for disqualification. 
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Tab 8 - Order Granting Certiorari and Pennitting Issues Raised as Alternate 
Grounds for Affirmance 
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The Order of the Court is slated below: 
Dated: July 05, 2017 Isl Thomas R. Lee 
I 0:24:03 AM Associate Chief Justice 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TIIE STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
---00000---
Cooper John Anthony Van Huizen, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Appellate Case No. 20170304-SC 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed on April 19, 
2017. 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted as to the following issues: 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Respondent was not required 
to demonstrate presetvation of his appellate claim that the juvenile court judge should 
have disqualified herself. 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a litigant is not required to 
show prejudice arising from an appearance of bias if a judge fails to disclose the facts 
generating the appearance of bias. 
The cross-petition for writ of certiorari is denied but the Cross-Petitioner may raise the 
issues identified in the cross-petition as alternate grounds for affirmance. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant to Rule 2 of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the Court suspends the provision of Rule 26(a) that permits the 
parties to stipulate to an extension of time to submit their briefs on the merits. The 
parties shall not be permitted to stipulate to an extension. The parties shall comply with 
the briefing schedule upon its issuance. 
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